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Elective English–I

Notes that formal logic, if carefully developed, will mirror precisely, not only the various relations
between all such propositions, but their various internal structures as well.
It is in this context that Russell also introduces his famous distinction between two kinds of
knowledge of truths: that which is direct, intuitive, certain and infallible, and that which is
indirect, derivative, uncertain and open to error (see 1905, 41f; 1911, 1912, and 1914b). To be
justified, every indirect knowledge claim must be capable of being derived from more fundamental,
direct or intuitive knowledge claims. The kinds of truths that are capable of being known
directly include both truths about immediate facts of sensation and truths of logic.

Eventually, Russell supplemented this distinction between direct and indirect knowledge with
his famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. As
Russell explains, “I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive
relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a
cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the
sort which constitutes presentation” (1911, 209). Later, he clarifies this point by adding that
acquaintance involves, not knowledge of truths, but knowledge of things (1912a, 44). Thus,
while both intuitive and derivative knowledge involve knowledge of propositions (or truths),
both knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description involve knowledge of objects
(or things). Since it is those objects with which we have direct acquaintance that are the least
questionable members of our ontology, it is these objects upon which Russell ultimately bases
his epistemology.
Russell’s contributions to metaphysics and epistemology were also unified by his views concerning
the centrality of both scientific knowledge in general and the importance of there being an
underlying scientific methodology that in large part is common to both philosophy and scientific
disciplines. In the case of philosophy, this methodology expressed itself through Russell’s use
of logical analysis. In fact, Russell often claimed that he had more confidence in his methodology
than in any particular philosophical conclusion.

This broad conception of philosophy arose in part from Russell’s idealist origins (see, e.g.,
Griffin 1991 and Hylton 1990a). This is so, even though Russell tells us that his one, true
revolution in philosophy came about as a result of his break from idealism. Russell saw that
the idealist doctrine of internal relations led to a series of contradictions regarding asymmetrical
(and other) relations necessary for mathematics. Thus, in 1898, he abandoned the idealism that
he had encountered as a student at Cambridge, together with his Kantian methodology, in
favour of a pluralistic realism. As a result, he soon became famous as an advocate of the “new
realism” and for his “new philosophy of logic,” emphasizing as he did the importance of
modern logic for philosophical analysis. The underlying themes of this “revolution” included
his belief in pluralism, his emphasis upon anti-psychologism, and his belief in the importance
of science. Each of these themes remained central to Russell’s philosophy for the remainder
of his life (see, e.g., Hager 1994 and Weitz 1944).

2.4 Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions

Russell’s philosophical methodology required the making and testing of hypotheses through
the weighing of evidence. Hence Russell’s comment that he wished to emphasize the “scientific
method” in philosophy (see, e.g., Irvine 1989). It also required the rigorous analysis of problematic
propositions using the machinery of first-order logic. It was Russell’s belief that by using the
new logic of his day, philosophers would be able to exhibit the underlying “logical form” of
natural-language statements. A statement’s logical form, in turn, would help philosophers
resolve problems of reference associated with the ambiguity and vagueness of natural language.

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