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Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)

Notes Sindhia and the Bhonsle went to war against the English Company, Jaswant Rao Holkar kept
aloof waiting the outcome of the conflict. In 1804 Holkar himself was drawn into a conflict with
the Company and single-handed could not meet the challenge. Thus, the absence of a corporate
spirit among the Maratha chiefs considerable weakened their ranks.
5. Inferior Military System of the Marathas: In military strength the Marathas were no match for
the English. Though not lacking in personal prowess and valour, the Marathas were inferior to
their opponents in organisation of the forces, in war weapons, in disciplined action and effective
leadership. The centrifugal tendencies of divided command and improper organisation account
for much of the Maratha failures. Treachery in the Maratha ranks played havoc. Fortescue in his
History of the British Army points out that at the battle of Assaye Pohlam’s artillery brigade betrayed
the master; had Pohlam’s brigade done its duty, the position of the British would have been in
great jeopardy. Again, Monsieur Perron, the Commander-in-Chief, was a mere adventurer whose
chief motive was to take all his ill-gotten wealth out of India. He resigned on the eve of the Second
Maratha War. His successor, Monsieur Louis Bourquin, was merely a cook in Calcutta about
whom Compton says that “there is no more contemptible character among the military adventurers
of the Hindustan than Bourquin, cook, pyrotechnist and poltroon.” The mercenary soldiers of the
Marathas had no higher motive than of personal interest; loss of a battle meant at worst a temporary
loss of employment to them.
Arthur Wellesley’s contention has been greatly developed by Sir Alfred Lyall in his book Rise and
Expansion of British Power in India to prove that the abandonment of the guerilla system of warfare
was a cardinal mistake of the Marathas. Thomas Munro, an authority on the military affairs of the
time, pointed out that the victories which Holkar won against Monson were because of ‘marches’
and convoys rather than of battles and ‘sieges’. It is further contended that the neglect of cavalry
on the part of the Sindhia and concentration on artillery and infantry affected adversely the mobility
of the army, depriving it of the chief advantage it had possessed against the armies of the Mughals.
The argument has been carried too far. One wonders how the Sindhia could keep his control over
the far-flung empire by keeping a band of guerillas, particularly when he had to fight pitched
battles against desperate enemies in the deserts of Rajputana. Perhaps the Maratha fault lay not in
abandoning the guerilla system of warfare, but in inadequate adoption of the modem techniques
of warfare. The Marathas neglected the paramount importance of artillery. Mahadaji Sindhia
deserves the credit of trying to fight the enemy with the enemy’s weapons. His battalions were
trained on the European model and factories were set up for the manufacture of fire-arms, but
these departments were entirely in the hand of foreigners whose loyalty in times of need was
always in doubt. The Poona Government also set up an artillery department, but it hardly
functioned effectively. The importance of powerful artillery we realise when we consider how
British artillery easily reduced many Maratha forts which had baffled the Mughal armies under
Aurangzeb. Undoubtedly, the. best results could have been achieved in a coordinated development
of all the three wings of the army, viz., infantry, cavalry and artillery.
6. Superior English Diplomacy: The English were superior to the Marathas in the game of diplomacy.
Before actual operations would start the Company would take care to win allies and isolate the
enemy diplomatically. The absence of unity among the Maratha chiefs considerably simplified
the task of the British. In the Second Maratha War the English won over the Gaekwar and the
Southern Maratha Jagirdars to their side, while the Peshwa was their ally by the Treaty of Bassein.
These diplomatic gains gave to the Company supply bases at Poona and in Gujrat and enabled
them to take quick offensive against the Sindhia’s territories of Ahmednager and Broach. Similarly,
the friendship of the Southern Maratha Jagirdars ensured to the Company the line of
communication between the British army and their supply base at Seringapatam.
7. Superior English Espionage: The Marathas were careless about military intelligence. The Marathi
historian Sardesai points out that while every British officer who toured their country used his
eyes and afterwards his tongue and pen, and while a number of Britishers could speak and
understand Maratha, the Marathas knew nothing about England, about the British syste’m of
Government, about their settlements and factories in India and outside, their character and
inclinations, their arms and armaments, perhaps even Nana Phadnavis did not at all possess such
details and the Marathas were woefully ignorant.

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