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Unit 10: George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Greek Institutions, and (b) Christianity. He was convinced that human history had culminated in Notes
Germany, and there was no more forward march to be made, which explained his reluctance to
speculate about the future.
Hegel, like Kant, was concerned with historical analysis, but differed from him in his ideas and
methods of analysis. Like Kant, he viewed history as the progressive manifestation of man’s
reason, but unlike Kant, he was disinterested as far as the future was concerned. His purpose was
to show that human history had been progressive till the present, and beyond that he had very
little to say. In a sense, Hegel believed that the philosophy of history was some kind of theodicy.
He agreed that from very early times, humans had speculated about God’s providence and the
power of reason. However, all those who had done so always thought that the logic of such
providence was beyond the comprehension of ordinary human beings. On the contrary, Hegel
thought that he was capable enough of demonstrating the basis for eternal reason and giving an
adequate reply to the question of manifestation of universal reason first in nature and then in
history, which was a record of human progress from one state to another, towards the individual’s
essential goals. He differed from Kant insofar as taking into account the basis of the human
condition that varied from one historical era to another was concerned. Kant, on the other hand,
treated freedom purely on philosophical grounds.
The idea of progress was of crucial importance to Hegel, as by this he stressed the development
from the rudiments to the final form of perfection. This progressive unfolding of human history
was explained by the idea of the dialectic—in essence the idea of the dialectic goes back to Socrates,
Hegel’s great hero—by which all the different concepts were bound together. These concepts were
not static, but dynamic, in the sense that when one fulfilled its role, it generated from within
another, which was in opposition to the first concept. The conflict between the two concepts
produced the third, which within its fold united the first two. This dialectical progression had to
be found in virtually everything : logic, nature and spirit.
One could notice striking differences in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology regarding
the progress of the Mind and the object of its attainment. In the Phenomenology, Hegel did not
mention specific countries, periods, dates, events or people. The emphasis was on the general
process of development of the mind, compelled by its inner necessity of realizing itself. The
analysis was on an abstract level. In the Phenomenology, Hegel described the progress of the mind
as developing towards absolute knowledge, while in the other two works he described the course
of history as progress towards the attainment of freedom. The inference one could make was that,
for Hegel, absolute knowledge and true freedom were intrinsically linked. In the Phenomenology,
Hegel saw all human history as the necessary path of the development of the mind. Freedom, for
Hegel, was not the ability to do what one pleased, but lay in developing an autonomous, free
mind. It meant rational choice. Reason was regarded as something universal, and hence the mind
was also inherently universal. For the human being to be free, he must fully comprehend the
rational and universal nature of his intellect; hence the link between freedom and knowledge in
Hegel’s paradigm.
However, in spite of the unique influence and the impressive structure of history that Hegel built,
it was one of the most severely criticized concepts. Plamentaz (1963 : Vol. II) inquired as to why
the spirit should be ultimately tied to the nation states when a synthesis in the universal process
looked more logical, when the process of history itself was universal. Hegel had no satisfactory
answer to this fundamental question, and his theory of the culmination of human history in the
nation states was not a very cogently argued case. MacIntyre pointed out that the Greek life was
far from being harmonious, and in fact was ridden with violent conflicts, which Hegel ignored.
Thus, for Hegel, history had a certain meaning, purpose and significance. It was not just a record
of the past. On the contrary, it was a progressive evolution and the world-historical individuals
were decisive influences on this evolution. However, history was not made by states or for states,
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