Page 274 - DSOC201_SOCIAL_STRUCTURE_AND_SOCIAL_CHANGE_ENGLISH
P. 274

Unit 12: Processes of Change


          prestige, but more humble folk imitated them in course of time. The priests lacked the courage—  Notes
          except during the early years of British rule—to throw their powerful patrons out of the caste, and as
          secularization spread among Brahmins, the priests had no alternative but to bow to the inevitable.
          Meanwhile, the style of life of the priests themselves became Westernized to some extent. Many even
          acquired a nodding acquaintance with English and were proud of displaying it.
          Regrettably, there have been no studies of occupational changes among different generations of priestly
          families. But evidence already available shows that in both Bangalore and Mysore cities
          intergenerational occupational changes have been highest among Brahmins. Noel Gist, who studied
          intercaste differences in Mysore and Bangalore cities in 1951-1952, has reported that intergenerational
          occupational differences were highest among Brahmins as compared with other caste categories. In
          Mysore city, for instance, 82.7 per cent of household heads had occupations different from those of
          their fathers, and 76.8 percent of their own sons had departed from paternal occupations. For the
          non-Brahmin group, the percentages of deviation were 55.7 and 49.4 respectively, while for the
          Scheduled Castes they were 44.8 and 56.8 Gist’s sample does not distinguish between priestly and
          lay Brahmins, but there is no reason to assume that the former were exempt from processes which
          affected the latter. From my own experience, I can recall many of my contemporaries in Mysore who
          came from priestly and orthodox families, but who chose secular careers.
          In a word, then, the gradual erosion of priestly authority and prestige, and the secularization of
          priests, have brought about a situation in which priests lack the confidence to take any initiative in
          religious or social reform. They do not have the intellectual equipment or the social position to
          undertake a reinterpretation of Hinduism that would suit modern circumstances. Since the beginning
          of the nineteenth century, such reinterpretation has come from the Westernized Hindu elite. The fact
          that this elite has been anti-ritualistic, as well as inclined to frown upon popular sacrifices, beliefs
          and practices, has stripped Hinduism of a great deal of its content.
          The situation depicted above highlights the fact that, unlike the Biblical religions, Hinduism is without
          a universal organization and a hierarchy of officials whose function it is to interpret it in the context
          of changing circumstances. While it is true that some Hindu sects—such as the Smarthas, Sri
          Vaishnavas and Madhvas, the Lingayats and several others—have elaborate organizations headed
          by pontiffs, these pontiffs have authority only within their sects or divisions within sects, and not for
          Hinduism as a whole.
          Another characteristic of Hinduism has been its extraordinary reliance on, if not inseparability from,
          the social structure. The three main elements of the social structure are caste, village community and
          family system. In Hindu India the political head, the king, was also the head of the social system,
          including caste. The relation of Hinduism to the state changed with the Muslim conquest of large
          parts of India. Some Muslim rulers were tolerant of Hinduism, while others who were not sought to
          convert infidels to the true faith and imposed jiziya or poll tax on non-Muslims. The British in their
          turn observed, on the whole, a policy of neutrality toward all religions, though the Church of England
          in India was supported from Indian revenues, and European missionaries enjoyed a favoured position
          thanks to the religious, cultural and racial links between them and the British rulers. It was only in
          the “native states” ruled by Hindu princes—such as Nepal, Travancore, Cochin, Mysore, Baroda,
          Jaipur and Kashmir—that royalty discharged some of the functions traditionally expected of it with
          regard to caste and appointment of monastic heads. The Hindu kingdom of Nepal was, and is, far
          more traditional in character than Hindu kingdoms elsewhere in the subcontinent, and today Nepal
          is the only Hindu kingdom in the world: “Until recently, the penal code of Nepal was based on the
          Shastras, and social, religious and criminal offences were dealt with by identical procedures. Brahmins
          were immune from capital punishment, and the crime of killing a cow could bring the death penalty.”
          If we are to understand future trends, the absence of a central organization for Hinduism, as well as
          lack of support from the political authority for maintenance of Hindu religion and social structure,
          must be viewed along with the radical changes occurring in the three institutions of caste, village
          community and family system. I have already dealt with the changes occurring in caste and shall not
          repeat them here. I shall merely point out that as a result of increased secularization and mobility and
          the spread of an equalitarian ideology, the caste system is no longer perpetuating values traditionally
          considered to be an essential part of Hinduism.


                                           LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY                                       269
   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279