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Unit 30: Existentialism

            concrete past constitutes an inauthentic lifestyle, and the same goes for all other kinds of facticity  Notes
            (having a body (e.g. one that doesn’t allow a person to run faster than the speed of sound),
            identity, values, etc.).
            Facticity is both a limitation and a condition of freedom. It is a limitation in that a large part of
            one’s facticity consists of things one couldn’t have chosen (birthplace, etc.), but a condition in the
            sense that one’s values most likely will depend on it. However, even though one’s facticity is “set
            in stone” (as being past, for instance), it cannot determine a person: The value ascribed to one’s
            facticity is still ascribed to it freely by that person. As an example, consider two men, one of
            whom has no memory of his past and the other remembers everything. They have both committed
            many crimes, but the first man, knowing nothing about this, leads a rather normal life while the
            second man, feeling trapped by his own past, continues a life of crime, blaming his own past for
            “trapping” him in this life. There is nothing essential about his committing crimes, but he
            ascribes this meaning to his past.
            However, to disregard one’s facticity when one, in the continual process of self-making, projects
            oneself into the future, would be to put oneself in denial of oneself, and would thus be inauthentic.
            In other words, the origin of one’s projection will still have to be one’s facticity, although in the
            mode of not being it (essentially).



              Notes  Aspect of facticity is that it entails angst, both in the sense that freedom “produces”
                    angst when limited by facticity, and in the sense that the lack of the possibility of
                    having facticity to “step in” for one to take responsibility for something one has
                    done also produces angst.


            30.4.6  Authenticity and Inauthenticity
            The theme of authentic existence is common to many existentialist thinkers. It is often taken to
            mean that one has to “find oneself” and then live in accordance with this self. A common
            misunderstanding is that the self is something one can find if one looks hard enough, that one’s
            true self is substantial.
            What is meant by authenticity is that in acting, one should act as oneself, not as one acts or as
            one’s genes or any other essence require. The authentic act is one that is in accordance with one’s
            freedom. Of course, as a condition of freedom is facticity, this includes one’s facticity, but not to
            the degree that this facticity can in any way determine one’s choices (in the sense that one could
            then blame one’s background for making the choice one made). The role of facticity in relation
            to authenticity involves letting one’s actual values come into play when one makes a choice
            (instead of, like Kierkegaard’s Aesthete, “choosing” randomly), so that one also takes
            responsibility for the act instead of choosing either-or without allowing the options to have
            different values.
            In contrast to this, the inauthentic is the denial to live in accordance with one’s freedom. This can
            take many forms, from pretending choices are meaningless or random, through convincing
            oneself that some form of determinism is true, to a sort of “mimicry” where one acts as “One
            should.” How “One” should act is often determined by an image one has of how one such as
            oneself acts. This image usually corresponds to some sort of social norm, but this does not mean
            that all acting in accordance with social norms is inauthentic: The main point is the attitude one
            takes to one’s own freedom and responsibility, and the extent to which one acts in accordance
            with this freedom.

            30.4.7 Despair
            Commonly defined as a loss of hope, Despair in existentialism is more specifically related to the
            reaction to a breakdown in one or more of the defining qualities of one’s self or identity. If a
            person is invested in being a particular thing, such as a bus driver or an upstanding citizen, and
            then finds their being-thing compromised, they would normally be found in state of despair—
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