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Unit 27: Elaine Showalter: Four Models of Feminism in “Feminist Criticism in Wilderness”—Biological...



        accommodate and permit. It is very difficult to propose theoretical coherence in an activity which  Notes
        by its nature is so eclectic and wide-ranging, although as a critical practice feminist reading has
        certainly been very influential. But in the free play of the interpretive field, the feminist critique
        can only compete with alternative readings, all of which have the built-in obsolescence of Buicks,
        cast away as newer readings take their place. As Kolodny, the most sophisticated theorist of
        feminist interpretation, has conceded:
             All the feminist is asserting, then, is her own equivalent right to liberate new (and
             perhaps different) significances from these same texts; and, at the same time, her right
             to choose which features of a text she takes as relevant because she is, after all, asking
             new and different questions of it. In the process, she claims neither definitiveness nor
             structural completeness for her different readings and reading systems, but only their
             usefulness in recognizing the particular achievements of woman-as-author and their
             applicability in conscientiously decoding woman-as-sign.
        Rather than being discouraged by these limited objectives, Kolodny found them the happy cause
        of the "playful pluralism" of feminist critical theory, a pluralism which she believes to be "the only
        critical stance consistent with the current status of the larger women's movement." Her feminist
        critic dances adroitly through the theoretical minefield.
        Keenly aware of the political issues involved and presenting brilliant arguments, Kolodny
        nonetheless fails to convince me that feminist criticism must altogether abandon its hope "of
        establishing some basic conceptual model." If we see our critical job as interpretation and
        reinterpretation, we must be content with pluralism as our critical stance. But if we wish to ask
        questions about the process and the contexts of writing, if we genuinely wish to define ourselves
        to the uninitiated, we cannot rule out the prospect of theoretical consensus at this early stage.
        All feminist criticism is in some sense revisionist, questioning the adequacy of accepted conceptual
        structures, and indeed most contemporary American criticism claims to be revisionist too. The
        most exciting and comprehensive case for this "revisionary imperative" is made by Sandra Gilbert:
        at its most ambitious, she asserts, feminist criticism "wants to decode and demystify all the disguised
        questions and answers that have always shadowed the connections between textuality and sexuality,
        genre and gender, psychosexual identity and cultural authority."" But in practice, the revisionary
        feminist critique is redressing a grievance and is built upon existing models. No one would deny
        that feminist criticism has affinities to other contemporary critical practices and methodologies
        and that the best work is also the most fully informed. Nonetheless, the feminist obsession with
        correcting, modifying, supplementing, revising, humanizing, or even attacking male critical theory
        keeps us dependent upon it and retards our progress in solving our own theoretical problems.
        What I mean here by "male critical theory" is a concept of creativity, literary history, or literary
        interpretation based entirely on male experience and put forward as universal. So long as we look
        to androcentric models for our most basic principles—even if we revise them by adding the feminist
        frame of reference-we are learning nothing new. And when the process is so one-sided, when male
        critics boast of their ignorance of feminist criticism, it is disheartening to find feminist critics still
        anxious for approval from the "white fathers" who will not listen or reply. Some feminist critics have
        taken upon themselves a revisionism which becomes a kind of homage; they have made Lacan the
        ladies' man of Diacritics and have forced Pierre Macherey into those dark alleys of the psyche where
        Engels feared to tread. According to Christiane Makward, the problem is even more serious in
        France than in the United States: "If neofeminist thought in France seems to have ground to a halt,"
        she writes, "it is because it has continued to feed on the discourse of the masters."
        It is time for feminist criticism to decide whether between religion and revision we can claim any
        firm theoretical ground of our own. In calling for a feminist criticism that is genuinely women
        centered, independent, and intellectually coherent, I do not mean to endorse the separatist fantasies
        of radical feminist visionaries or to exlude from our critical practice a variety of intellectual tools.
        But we need to ask much more searchingly what we want to know and how we can find answers
        to the questions that come from our experience. I do not think that feminist criticism can find a
        usable past in the androcentric critical tradition. It has more to learn from women's studies than
        from English studies, more to learn from international feminist theory than from another seminar


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