Page 90 - DENG501_LITERARY_CRITICISM_AND_THEORIES

Literary Criticism and Theories

Notes 7.6. Derrida’s Other Activities

7.6.1 Responsibility to the Other
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of Derrida's later philosophy is his advocation of the tout autre,
the wholly other, and The Gift of Death will be our main focus in explaining what this exaltation of
the wholly other might mean. Any attempt to sum up this short but difficult text would have to
involve the recognition of a certain incommensurability between the particular and the universal,
and the dual demands placed upon anybody intending to behave responsibly. For Derrida, the
paradox of responsible behaviour means that there is always a question of being responsible
before a singular other (e.g. a loved one, God, etc.), and yet we are also always referred to our
responsibility towards others generally and to what we share with them. Derrida insists that this
type of aporia, or problem, is too often ignored by the "knights of responsibility" who presume
that accountability and responsibility in all aspects of life - whether that be guilt before the human
law, or even before the divine will of God - is quite easily established. These are the same people
who insist that concrete ethical guidelines should be provided by any philosopher worth his or
her 'salt' and who ignore the difficulties involved in a notion like responsibility, which demands
something importantly different from merely behaving dutifully.
Derrida's exploration of Abraham's strange and paradoxical responsibility before the demands of
God, which consists in sacrificing his only son Isaac, but also in betraying the ethical order through
his silence about this act, is designed to problematise this type of ethical concern that exclusively
locates responsibility in the realm of generality. In places, Derrida even verges on suggesting that
this more common notion of responsibility, which insists that one should behave according to a
general principle that is capable of being rationally validated and justified in the public realm,
should be replaced with something closer to an Abrahamian individuality where the demands of
a singular other (e.g. God) are importantly distinct from the ethical demands of our society.
Derrida equivocates regarding just how far he wants to endorse such a conception of responsibility,
and also on the entire issue of whether Abraham's willingness to murder is an act of faith, or
simply an unforgivable transgression. As he says, "Abraham is at the same time, the most moral
and the most immoral, the most responsible and the most irresponsible". This equivocation is, of
course, a defining trait of deconstruction, which has been variously pilloried and praised for this
refusal to propound anything that the tradition could deem to be a thesis. Nevertheless, it is
relatively clear that in The Gift of Death, Derrida intends to free us from the common assumption
that responsibility is to be associated with behaviour that accords with general principles capable
of justification in the public realm (i.e. liberalism). In opposition to such an account, he emphasises
the "radical singularity" of the demands placed upon Abraham by God and those that might be
placed on us by our own loved ones. Ethics, with its dependence upon generality, must be
continually sacrificed as an inevitable aspect of the human condition and its aporetic demand to
decide. As Derrida points out, in writing about one particular cause rather than another, in pursuing
one profession over another, in spending time with one's family rather than at work, one inevitably
ignores the "other others", and this is a condition of any and every existence. He argues that: "I
cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing
the other other, the other others". For Derrida, it seems that the Buddhist desire to have attachment
to nobody and equal compassion for everybody is an unattainable ideal. He does, in fact, suggest
that a universal community that excludes no one is a contradiction in terms. According to him,
this is because: "I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, to any other) only by failing in my
responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this
sacrifice; I must always hold my peace about it… What binds me to this one or that one, remains
finally unjustifiable". Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only
possible by being irresponsible to the "other others", that is, to the other people and possibilities
that haunt any and every existence.

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