Page 126 - DCOM207_LABOUR_LAWS

Unit 7: Definitions under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923

Siddappa who paid him rupees thirty (` 30.00) only per day, but the Tribunal disbelieved Notes
him and rejected his testimony. On the basis of the post mortem report, the Tribunal held
that Nagaraj, at the time of his death, was aged about fifteen years. It further held that there
was no evidence to show that at the time of his death Nagaraj earned anything, pointing out
that in paragraph 22 of the claim petition nothing material was mentioned about the loss of
earning due to his death. Then, rather gratuitously it fixed the amount of compensation at
rupees thirty thousand plus two thousand (` 30,000.00 + ` 2,000.00) observing as follows:
“Hence the maximum compensation that can be granted to the petitioner herein would
be only about ` 30,000-00 as being just and reasonable and a sum of ` 2,000-00 toward
funeral and obsequious expenses etc. and therefore the petitioners are granted sum total
compensation amount of ` 32,000-00.”

Having, thus, put the worth of the life of Nagaraj at rupees thirty thousand (` 30,000.00)
only the Tribunal proceeded to consider whether the appellants were entitled to receive
even this amount from the owner of the car or the insurance company (second part of issue
no. 3 and issue no. 4). It held that neither the owner of the car nor the insurance company
was liable to pay anything to any of the claimants, including the appellants, because
Basavaraj had taken out the car of his employer unauthorisedly and against his express
instructions and had caused the accident by driving the car very rashly after consuming
liquor. At the time of accident the car had been taken completely away from the control of
its owner. In a sense it was stolen by the driver, even though temporarily. The accident was,
thus, completely outside the insurance policy. No compensation was, therefore, payable to
any of the claimants under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Up to this stage no exception can be taken to the view taken by the Tribunal. But surprisingly
the Tribunal also rejected the express prayer made on behalf of the appellants and other
claimants to at least grant the ‘no fault compensation’ as provided under section 140 of the
Act. The Tribunal discussed the issue over six pages in its judgment before turning down
the claim. It seems to have taken the view, that had the claim for ‘no fault compensation’
been made at the beginning of the proceeding, it might have considered it favourably. But
the claim was pressed at a belated stage when it was considering the claim for compensation
under section 166 of the Act and more importantly had found that the owner of the car had
no responsibility for the accident. In this connection, the Tribunal observed as follows:

“However, in these cases as already referred to above, if at the initial stage itself if the
learned counsel Sri. M. Gnana Swamy had pressed the Tribunal to pass interim award on
I.A.I in all the four cases, then the I.A.I filed in all four cases would have been definitely
allowed and this Tribunal would have directed both the respondents 1 & 2 and more
particularly respondent No.2 to deposit the interim compensation amount leaving open
the liability aspect at the fag end of these cases i.e., at the arguments stage. Now that stage
is already over and as such now this Tribunal has to consider equally as to whether at this
stage as per the principle of no fault liability under s.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
these petitioners are entitled for the interim in compensation amount.”
“Now as regards the no fault liability as already referred to above, perhaps the petitioners
would have been granted the interim compensation amount at the initial stage, but now it
cannot be done, since the merits of the cases are being dealt with after hearing the arguments
at the final stage and the main cases are being disposed of on merits as such.”
“Hence in view of my finding that the car was being used totally outside the course of
the employment of the driver of the car and totally without the knowledge and consent
of the 1st respondent, I hold that even as regards this no fault liability claim also, the 1st
respondent or for the matter 2nd respondent amount to any of the petitioner’s hearing.
Hence this being the position, I am constrained to observe and hold that although as per
the available evidence on record the petitioners are entitled for compensation amount as
Contd...

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