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Corporate Governance and Ethics




                    Notes          6.1.2  The Greenbury Report 1995

                                   The committee published its report on 17th July 1995 and its key themes were: ‘accountability,
                                   responsibility, full disclosure, alignment of Director and shareholder interests, and improved
                                   company performance’ (Directors’ Remuneration: Greenbury 1995). The Greenbury Committee
                                   was formed after widespread public  concern over what were  seen as  excessive amounts of
                                   remuneration paid to directors of quoted companies and newly privatised companies. ‘Recent
                                   concerns about executive remuneration have centered  above all on some large pay increases
                                   and large gains from share options in the recently privatised utility industries. These increases
                                   have sometimes coincided with staff reductions, pay restraints for other staff and price increases…
                                   there have also been concerns  about the  amounts of compensation paid to some  departing
                                   directors’  (Greenbury Report,  1995:9). The Greenbury Committee  were keen  to ensure that
                                   directors’ remuneration was linked to company performance, and the committee did not seem
                                   to see a problem with high levels of pay per se, as long as they were justified on the basis of the
                                   company’s financial results.
                                   A key concern should be to ensure, through the remuneration system, that director’s share the
                                   interest of shareholders in making the company successful. Performance-related remuneration
                                   can be highly effective in aligning interest in this way. In many companies, therefore, there will
                                   be a case for a high gearing of performance-related to fixed pay. But there are two constraints on
                                   this. First, there will usually be a level of basic salary below which it will not be practicable to
                                   go. Second, the requirements and priorities of companies vary. The gearing, which suits one
                                   company, may be quite unsuitable for another (Greenbury Report 1995, 38).
                                   The Greenbury Report also addressed the problem of departing directors whose performance
                                   had not been noticeably successful, but who still manage to live the company with generous
                                   compensation for loss of office.

                                   Compensation payments to directors on loss of office have been a cause of public and shareholders
                                   concern in recent times. Criticism has been directed at the scale of some of the payments made
                                   and at their apparent lack of justification in terms of performance. Some payments have been
                                   described as ‘rewards for failure’ (Greenbury Report, 1995, 45). When the Greenbury Report was
                                   published in 1995 it dealt specifically with the question of directors’ remuneration and many of
                                   its recommendations were developed from the earlier Cadbury Report. The Greenbury Report
                                   recommended that the remuneration committee  should consist exclusively of  non-executive
                                   directors (the Cadbury Report had recommended wholly or mainly non-executive directors).
                                   These non-executive directors should have no personal financial interest, no potential conflicts
                                   of interest arising from cross-directorships  and no  day-to-day involvement in running  the
                                   business.


                                   6.1.3  The Hampel Report 1998

                                   The Hampel Committee was created in 1995 to review implementation of the findings of the
                                   Cadbury and Greenbury Committees. The Hampel Committee published its report in 1998.
                                   Most of the recommendations in the earlier reports were then published in 1998 by the London
                                   Stock Exchange as The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice. The
                                   Combined Code (although redrafted since its original publication) is the currently applicable
                                   code of best corporate governance practice for UK listed companies. The recommendations of
                                   Hampel were along similar lines and on similar issues to Cadbury.
                                   An important contribution made by the Hampel Report was the emphasis attributed to avoiding
                                   a prescriptive approach to corporate governance improvements  and recommendations. The
                                   Cadbury Report highlighted the importance of focusing on the spirit of corporate governance
                                   reform, and Hampel reinforced this by stipulating that companies and shareholders needed to




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