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Unit 10: National Movements and Indian Independence

it because the action at Chauri Chaura was a symbol and an indication of the growing militancy Notes
of the Indian masses, of their growing radicalization, of their willingness to launch an attack on
the status quo of property relations. Frightened by this radical possibility and by the prospect of
the movement going out of his hands and into the hands of radical forces, and in order to protect
the interests of landlords and capitalists who would inevitably be at the receiving end of this
violence, Gandhiji cried halt to the movement. They have found supportive proof in the resolution
of the Congress Working Committee of 12 February 1922 popularly known as the Bardoli resolution
which while announcing the withdrawal, asked the peasants to pay taxes and tenants to pay rents.
This, they say, was the real though hidden motive behind the historic decision of February 1922.
It seems, however, that Gandhiji’s critics have been less than fair to him. First, the argument that
violence in a remote village could not be a sufficient cause for the decision is in itself a weak one.
Gandhiji had repeatedly warned that he did not even want any non-violent movement in any
other part of the country while he was conducting mass civil disobedience in Bardoli, and in fact
had asked the Andhra PCC to withdraw the permission that it had granted to some of the District
Congress Committees to start civil disobedience. One obvious reason for this was that, in such a
situation of mass ferment and activity, the movement might easily take a violent turn, either due
to its own volatile nature or because of provocation by the authorities concerned (as had actually
happened in Bombay in November 1921 and later in Chauri Chaura); also if violence occurred
anywhere it could easily be made the excuse by the Government to launch a massive attack on the
movement as a whole. The Government could always cite the actual violence in one part as proof
of the likelihood of violence in another part of the country, and thus justify its repression. This
would upset the whole strategy of non-violent civil disobedience which was based on the principle
that the forces of repression would always stand exposed since they would be using armed force
against peaceful civil resisters. It was, therefore, not enough to assert that there was no connection
between Chauri Chaura and Bardoli.
It is entirely possible that in Gandhiji’s assessment the chances of his being allowed to conduct a
mass civil disobedience campaign in Bardoli had receded further after Chauri Chaura. The
Government would have had excuse to remove him and other activists from the scene and use
force to cow down the people. Mass civil disobedience would be defeated even before it was given
a fair trail. By taking the onus of withdrawal on himself and on the Working Committee, Gandhiji
was protecting the movement from likely repression, and the people from demoralization. True,
the withdrawal itself led to considerable demoralization, especially of the active political workers,
but it is likely that the repression and crushing of the movement (as happened in 1932) would have
led to even greater demoralization. Perhaps, in the long run, it was better to have felt that, if only
Gandhiji had not withdrawn the movement, it would have surged forward, than to see it crushed
and come to the conclusion that it was not possible for a mass movement to succeed in the face of
government repression. It is necessary to remember that, after all, the Non-Cooperation Movement
was the first attempt at an all-India mass struggle against the British, and a serious reverse at this
elementary stage could have led to a prolonged period of demoralization and passivity.
The other argument that the real motive for withdrawal was the fear of the growth of radical
forces and that Chauri Chaura was proof of the emergence of precisely such a radical sentiment is
on even thinner ground. The crowd at Chauri Chaura had not demonstrated any intention of
attacking landlords or overturning the structure of property relations, they were merely angered
by the overbearing behaviour of policemen and vented their wrath by attacking them. Peasant
unrest in most of Avadh and Malabar had died out long before this time, and the Eka movement
that was on in some of the rural areas of Avadh showed no signs of wanting to abolish the
zamindari system; it only wanted zamindars to stop ‘illegal’ cesses and arbitrary rent enhancements.
In fact, one of the items of the oath that was taken by peasants who joined the Eka movement was
that they would ‘pay rent regularly at Kharif and Rabi. The no-tax movement in Guntur was very
much within the framework of the Non-Cooperation Movement; it was directed against the
government and remained totally peaceful. Moreover, it was already on the decline before February
1922. It is difficult to discern where the threat from radical tendencies is actually located.

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