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Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)
Notes So convinced was Gandhiji that the time was now ripe for struggle that he said to Louis Fischer in
an interview in the beginning of June: ‘I have become impatient ... I may not be able to convince
the Congress ... I will go ahead nevertheless and address myself directly to the people.’ He did not
have to carry out this threat and, as before, the Congress accepted the Mahatma’s expert advice on
the timing of a mass struggle.
Though Gandhiji himself had begun to talk of the coming struggle for some time now, it was at the
Working Committee meeting at Wardha on 14 July, 1942 that the Congress first accepted the idea
of a struggle. The All-India Congress Committee was then to meet in Bombay in August to ratify
this decision.
Do or Die: The historic August meeting at Gowalia Tank in Bombay was unprecedented in the
popular enthusiasm it generated. Huge crowds waited outside as the leaders deliberated on the
issue. And the feeling of anticipation and expectation ran so high that in the open session, when
the leaders made their speeches before the many thousands who had collected to hear them, there
was pin-drop silence.
Gandhiji’s speech, delivered in his usual quiet and unrhetorical style, recount many who were in
the audience, had the most electrifying impact. He first made it clear that ‘the actual struggle does
not commence this moment. You have only placed all your powers in my hands. I will now wait
upon the Viceroy and plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress demand. That process is
likely to take two or three weeks.’ But, he added: ‘you may take it from me that I am not going to
strike a bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not going to be satisfied with
anything short of complete freedom. Maybe, he will propose the abolition of salt tax, the drink
evil, etc. But I will say: “Nothing less than freedom.” He followed this up with the now famous
exhortation: ‘Do or Die.’ To quote: ‘Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint
it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: “Do or Die.” We
shall either free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery.’
Gandhiji’s speech also contained specific instructions for different sections of the people.
Government servants would not yet be asked to resign, but they should openly declare their
allegiance to the Congress, soldiers were also not to leave their posts, but they were to ‘refuse to
fire on our own people.’ The Princes were asked to ‘accept the sovereignty of your own people,’
instead of paying homage to a foreign power.’ And the people of the Princely States were asked
to declare that they ‘(were) part of the Indian nation and that they (would) accept the leadership
of the Princes, if the latter cast their lot with the People, but not otherwise.’ Students were to give
up studies if they were sure they could continue to remain firm till independence was achieved.
On 7 August, Gandhiji had placed the instructions he had drafted before the Working Committee,
and in these he had proposed that peasants ‘who have the courage, and are prepared to risk their
all’ should refuse to pay the land revenue. Tenants were told that ‘the Congress holds that the
land belongs to those who work on it and to no one else.’ Where the zamindari system prevails . if
the zamindar makes common cause with the ryot, his portion of the revenue, which may be settled
by mutual agreement, should be given to him. But if a zamindar wants to side with the Government,
no tax should be paid to him.’ These instructions were not actually issued because of the preventive
arrests, but they do make Gandhiji’s intentions clear.
The Government, however, was in no mood to either negotiate with the Congress or wait for the
movement to be formally launched. In the early hours of 9 August, in a single sweep, all the top
leaders of the Congress were arrested and taken to unknown destinations. The Government had
been preparing for the strike since the outbreak of the War itself, and since 1940 had been ready
with an elaborate Revolutionary Movement Ordinance. On 8 August, 1940, the Viceroy, Linlithgow,
in a personal letter to the Governors made his intentions clear: ‘I feel very strongly that the only
possible answer to a ‘declaration of war’ by any section of Congress in the present circumstances
must be a declared determination to crush the organization as a while.’ For two years, Gandhiji
had avoided walking into the trap set for him by refusing to make a rash and premature strike and
had carefully built up the tempo through the Individual Civil Disobedience Movement,
organizational revamping and a consistent propaganda campaign. But now, the Government was
unwilling to allow him any more time to pursue his strategy. In anticipation of the AICC’s passing
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