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Unit 10: National Movements and Indian Independence

The powerful attraction of the Quit India Movement and its elemental quality is also demonstrated Notes
by the fact that hundreds of Communists at the local and village levels participated in the movement
despite the official position taken by the Communist Party. Though they sympathized with the
strong anti-fascist sentiments of their leaders, yet they felt the irresistible pull of the movement
and, for at least a few days or weeks, joined in it along with the rest of the Indian people.
The debate on the Quit India Movement has centered particularly on two issues. First, was the
movement a spontaneous outburst, or an organized rebellion? Second, how did the use of violence
by the people in this struggle square with the overall Congress policy of non-violent struggle?
First, the element of spontaneity in the movement of 1942 was certainly larger than in the earlier
movements, though even in 1919-22, as well as in 1930-31 and 1932, the Congress leadership
allowed considerable room for popular initiative and spontaneity. In fact, the whole pattern of the
Gandhian mass movements was that the leadership chalked out a broad programme of action and
left its implementation at the local level to the initiative of the local and grass roots level political
activists and the masses. Even in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930, perhaps the most
organized of the Gandhian mass movements, Gandhiji signalled the launching of the struggle by
the Dandi March and the breaking of the salt law; the leaders and the people at the local levels
decided whether they were going to stop payment of land revenue and rent, or offer satyagraha
against forest laws, or picket liquor shops, or follow any of the other items of the programme. Of
course, in 1942, even the broad programme had not yet been spelt out clearly since the leadership
was yet to formally launch the movement. But, in a way, the degree of spontaneity and popular
initiative that was actually exercised had been sanctioned by the leadership itself. The resolution
passed by the AICC on 8 August 1942 clearly stated: ‘A time may come when it may not be
possible to issue instruction or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress
committees can function. When this happens, every man and woman who is participating in this
movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions
issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide.’
Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically, politically and organizationally preparing
for the struggle for a long time. From 1937 onwards, the organization had been revamped to undo
the damage suffered during the repression of 1932-34. In political and ideological terms as well,
the Ministries had added considerably to Congress support and prestige. In East U.P. and Bihar,
the areas of the most intense activity in 1942 were precisely the ones in which considerable
mobilization and organizational work had been carried out from 1937 onwards. In Gujarat, Sardar
Patel had been touring Bardoli and other areas since June 1942 warning the people of an impending
struggle and suggesting that no-revenue campaigns could well be a part of it. Congress Socialists
in Poona had been holding training camps for volunteers since June 1942. Gandhiji himself, through
the Individual Civil Disobedience campaign in 1940-41, and more directly since early 1942, had
prepared the people for the coming battle, which he said would be ‘short and swift.’
In any case, in a primarily hegemonic struggle as the Indian national movement was, preparedness
for struggle cannot be measured by the volume of immediate organizational activity but by the
degree of hegemonic influence that the movement has acquired over the people.
How did the use of violence in 1942 square with the Congress policy of non-violence? For one,
there were many who refused to use or sanction violent means and confined themselves to the
traditional weaponry of the Congress. But many of those, including many staunch Gandhians,
who used ‘violent means’ in 1942 felt that the peculiar circumstances warranted their use. Many
maintained that the cutting of telegraph wires and the blowing up of bridges was all right as long
as human life was not taken.
Others frankly admitted that they could not square the violence they used, or connived at, with
their belief in non-violence, but that they did it all the same. Gandhiji refused to condemn the
violence of the people because he saw it as a reaction to the much bigger violence of the state. In
Francis Hutchins’ view, Gandhiji’s major objection to violence was that its use prevented mass
participation in a movement, but that, in 1942, Gandhiji had come round to the view that mass
participation would not be restricted as a result of violence.

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