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Unit 10: National Movements and Indian Independence

Loyalists’ Crisis Notes
If the loyalists’ crisis was one of faith, the services’ dilemma was that of action. Action could be
decisive only if policy was clear-cut — repression or conciliation — not both. The policy mix could
not but create problems when the same set of officials had to implement both poles of policy. This
dilemma first arose in the mid-1930s when officials were worried by the prospect of popular
ministries as the Congressmen they repressed during the Civil Disobedience Movement were
likely to become their political masters in the provincial Ministries. This prospect soon became a
reality in eight provinces.
Constitutionalism wrecked services morale as effectively as the mass movement before it, though
this is seldom realized. If fear of authority was exorcised by mass non-violent action, confidence
was gained because of ‘Congress Raj.’ People could not fail to notice that the British Chief Secretary
in Madras took to wearing khadi or that the Revenue Secretary in Bombay, on tour with the
Revenue Minister, Morarji Desai, would scurry across the railway platform from his first-class
compartment to the latter’s third-class carriage so that the Honourable Minister may not be kept
waiting. Among Indian officials, disloyalty was not evident, but where loyalty to the Raj was
paraded earlier, ‘it was the done thing to parade one’s patriotism and, if possible, a third cousin
twice removed who had been to jail in the civil disobedience movement.’
But most importantly, the likelihood of Congress returning to power became a consideration with
officials when dealing with subsequent Congress agitations. There was no refusal to carry out
orders, but in some places this consideration resulted in half-hearted action against the individual
disobedience movement in U.P. in 1940 and even against the 1942 rebels in East U.P. and Bihar.
But action was generally harsh in 1942 and this was to create concrete entanglements between
repression and conciliation at the end of the War when Congressmen were released and provincial
Ministries were again on the cards. Morale of officials nosedived when Congressmen’s demands
for enquiries and calls for revenge were not proceeded against on the ground that some latitude
had to be allowed during electioneering. The previous Viceroy, Linlithgow, had pledged that
there would be no enquiries, but the services had little faith in the Government’s ability to withstand
Congress pressure. The then Viceroy, Wavell, confessed that enquiries were the most difficult
issue posed by the formation of provincial Ministries.
By the end of the War, the portents were clear to those officials and policy-makers who understood
the dynamics of power and authority. The demand for leniency to INA men from within the army
and the revolt in a section of the RIN further conveyed to the far-sighted officials, as much as a
full-scale mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm brewing this time may
prove irrepressible. The structure was still intact, but it was feared that the services and armed
forces may not be reliable if Congress started a mass movement of the 1942 type after the elections,
which provincial Ministries would aid, not control. The Viceroy summed up the prospect: ‘We
could still probably suppress such a revolt’ but ‘we have nothing to put in its place and should be
driven to an almost entirely official rule, for which the necessary numbers of efficient officials do
not exist.’
Once it was recognized that British rule could not survive on the old basis for long, a graceful
withdrawal from India, to be effected after a settlement had been reached on the modalities of
transfer of power and the nature of the post-imperial relationship between Britain and India,
became the overarching aim of British policy-makers. The British Government was clear that a
settlement was a must both for good future relations and to bury the ghost of a mass movement.
Since failure could not be afforded, the concessions had to be such as would largely meet Congress
demands. With the Congress demand being that the British quit India, the Cabinet Mission went
out to India in March 1946 to negotiate the setting up of a national government and to set into
motion a machinery for transfer of power. It was not an empty gesture like the Cripps Mission in
1942 — the Cabinet Mission was prepared for a long stay.
The situation seemed ripe for a settlement as the imperialist rulers were cognisant of the necessity
of a settlement and the nationalist leaders were willing to negotiate with them. But rivers of blood
were to flow before Indian independence, tacitly accepted in early 1946, became a reality in mid

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