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Unit 10: National Movements and Indian Independence

their main point i.e. a unified India, all their other points would be met. Whether it was ruling out Notes
independence for the princes or unity for Bengal or Hyderabad’s joining up with Pakistan instead
of India, Mountbatten firmly supported Congress on these issues. He got His Majesty’s Government
to agree to his argument that Congress goodwill was vital if India was to remain in the
Commonwealth.
The Mountbatten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to be known, sought to effect an early
transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status to two successor states, India and Pakistan.
Congress was willing to accept Dominion Status for a while because it felt it must assume full
power immediately and meet boldly the explosive situation in the country. As Nehru put it,
‘Murder stalks the streets and the most amazing cruelties are indulged in by both the individual
and the mob.’ Besides Dominion Status gave breathing time to the new administration as British
officers and civil service officials could stay on for a while and let Indians settle in easier into their
new positions of authority. For Britain, Dominion Status offered a chance of keeping India in the
Commonwealth, even if temporarily, a prize not to be spurned. Though Jinnah offered to bring
Pakistan into the Commonwealth, a greater store was laid by India’s membership of the
Commonwealth, as India’s economic strength and defence potential were deemed sounder and
Britain had a greater value of trade and investment there.
The rationale for the early date for transfer of power, 15th August 1947, was securing Congress
agreement to Dominion Status. The additional benefit was that the British could escape responsibility
for the rapidly deteriorating communal situation. As it is, some officials were more than happy to
pack their bags and leave the Indians to stew in their own juice. As Patel said to the Viceroy, the
situation was one where ‘you won’t govern yourself, and you won’t let us govern.’ Mountbatten
was to defend his advancing the date to 15th August, 1947 on the ground that things would have
blown up under their feet had they not got out when they did. Ismay, the Viceroy’s Chief of Staff,
felt that August, 1947 was too late, rather than too early. From the British point of view, a hasty
retreat was perhaps the most suitable action. That does not make it the inevitable option, as
Mountbatten and Ismay would have us believe. Despite the steady erosion of government authority,
the situation of responsibility without power was still a prospect rather than a reality. In the short
term the British could assert their authority, but did not care to, as Kripalani, then Congress
President, pertinently pointed out to Mountbatten. Moreover, the situation, rather than warranting
withdrawal of authority, cried out for someone to wield it.
If abdication of resposibility was callous, the speed with which it was done made it worse. The
seventy-two day timetable, 3rd June to 15th August 1947, for both transfer of power and division
of the country, was to prove disastrous. Senior officials in India like the Punjab Governor, Jenkins,
and the Commander-in-Chief, Auchinleck, felt that peaceful division could take a few years at the
very least. As it happened, the Partition Council had to divide assets, down to typewriters and
printing presses, in a few weeks. There were no transitional institutional structures within which
the knotty problems spilling over from division could be tackled. Mountbatten had hoped to be
common Governor-General of India and Pakistan and provide the necessary link but this was not
to be as Jinnah wanted the position himself. Hence even the joint defence machinery set up failed
to last beyond December 1947 by which time Kashmir had already been the scene of a military
conflict rather than a political settlement.
The Punjab massacres that accompanied Partition were the final indictment of Mountbatten. His
loyal aide, Ismay, wrote to his wife on 16 September 1947: ‘Our mission was so very nearly a
success: it is sad that it has ended up such a grim and total failure.’ The early date, 15th August
1947, and the delay in announcing the Boundary Commission Award, both Mountbatten’s decisions,
compounded the tragedy that took place. A senior army official, Brigadier Bristow, posted in
Punjab in 1947, was of the view that the Punjab tragedy would not have occurred had partition
been deferred for a year or so. Lockhart, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army from 15 August
to 31 December 1947, endorsed this view: ‘Had officials in every grade in the civil services, and all
the personnel of the armed services, been in position in their respective new countries before
Independence Day, it seems there would have been a better chance of preventing widespread
disorder.’ The Boundary Commission Award was ready by 12th August, 1947 but Mountbatten

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