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Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)

Notes 1947. By early 1946 the imperialism nationalism conflict, being resolved in principle, receded from
the spotlight. The stage was then taken over by the warring conceptions of the post-imperial order
held by the British, the Congress and the Muslim League.
The Congress demand was for transfer of power to one centre, with minorities’ dernands being
worked out in a framework ranging from autonomy to Muslim provinces to self-determination on
secession from the Indian Union — but after the British left. The British bid was for a united India,
friendly with Britain and an active partner in Commonwealth defence. It was believed that a
divided India would lack depth in defence, frustrate joint defence plans and be a blot on Britain’s
diplomacy. Pakistan was not seen by Britain as her natural future ally, as the Government’s policy
of fostering the League ever since its inception in 1906 and the alignment today between Pakistan
and the Western imperialist bloc may suggest.
British policy in 1946 clearly reflected this preference for a united India, in sharp contrast to earlier
declarations. Attlee’s 15 March 1946 statement that a ‘minority will not be allowed to place a veto
on the progress of the majority’ was a far cry from Wavell’s allowing Jinnah to wreck the Simla
Conference in June-July 1945 by his insistence on nominating all Muslims. The Cabinet Mission
was convinced that Pakistan was not viable and that the minorities’ autonomy must somehow be
safeguarded within the framework of a united India. The Mission Plan conceived three sections,
A — comprising Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, CP. and Orissa; B — consisting of Punjab,
N WFP and Sind; and C — of Bengal and Assam — which would meet separately to decide on
group constitutions. There would be a common centre controlling defence, foreign affairs and
communications. After the first general elections a province could come out of a group. After ten
years a province could call for a reconsideration of the group or union constitution. Congress
wanted that a province need not wait till the first elections to leave a group, it should have the
option not to join it in the first place. It had Congress-ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP (which
were in Sections C and B respectively) in mind when it raised this question. The League wanted
provinces to have the right to question the union constitution now, not wait for ten years. There
was obviously a problem in that the Mission Plan was ambivalent on whether grouping was
compulsory or optional. It declared that grouping was optional but sections were compulsory.
This was a contradiction, which rather than removing, the Mission deliberately quibbled about in
the hope of somehow reconciling the irreconcileable.
The Congress and League interpreted the Mission Plan in their own way, both seeing it as a
confirmation of their stand. Thus, Patel maintained that the Mission’s Plan was against Pakistan,
that the League’s veto was gone and that one Constituent Assembly was envisaged. The League
announced its acceptance of the Plan on 6 June in so far as the basis of Pakistan was implied in the
Mission’s plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping. Nehru asserted the Congress Working
Committee’s particular interpretation of the plan in his speech to the AICC on 7 July 1946: ‘We are
not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly.’ The
implication was that the Assembly was sovereign and would decide rules of procedure. Jinnah
seized the opportunity provided by Nehru’s speech to withdraw the League’s acceptance of the
Mission Plan on 29th July, 1946.
The dilemma before the Government was whether to go ahead and form the Interim Government
with the Congress or await League agreement to the plan. Wavell, who had opted for the second
course at the Simla Conference an year earlier, preferred to do the same again. But His Majesty’s
Government, especially the Secretary of State, argued that it was vital to get Congress cooperation.
Thus, the Interim Government was formed on 2nd September 1946 with Congress members alone
with Nehru as de facto head. This was against the League’s insistence that all settlements be
acceptable to it. The British in 1946, in keeping with their strategic interests in the post-independence
Indian subcontinent, took up a stance very different from their earlier posture of encouraging
communal forces and denying the legitimacy of nationalism and the representative nature of the
Congress. Continuance of rule had demanded one stance, withdrawal and post-imperial links
dictated a contrary posture.
However, Jinnah had no intention of allowing the British to break with their past. His thinly
veiled threat to Attlee that he should ‘avoid compellinglhe Muslims to shed their blood . . . (by a)

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