Page 161 - DHIS204_DHIS205_INDIAN_FREEDOM_STRUGGLE_HINDI

Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)

Notes A corresponding graph could also be drawn of the demoralization of the British officials and the
changing loyalties of Indian officials and loyalists, which would tell the same story of nationalist
success, but differently. In this tale, nationalism would not come across as a force, whose
overwhelming presence left no place for the British. Rather, it would show the concrete way in
which the national movement eroded imperialist hegemony, gnawed at the pillars of the colonial
structure and reduced British political strategy to a mess of contradictions.
An important point to be noted is that British rule was maintained in part on the basis of the
consent or at least acquiescence of many sections of the Indian people. The social base of the
colonial regime was among the zamindars and upper classes etc., the ‘loyalists’ who received the
main share of British favours and offices. These were the Indians who manned the administration,
supported government policy and worked the reforms the British reluctantly and belatedly
introduced. The British also secured the consent of the people to their rule by successfully getting
them to believe in British justice and fairplay, accept the British officer as the mai-bap of his people,
and appreciate the prevalence of Pax Brittanica. Few genuinely believed in ‘Angrezi Raj ki Barkaten’,
but it sufficed for the British if people were impressed by the aura of stolidity the Raj exuded and
concluded that its foundations were unshakable. The Raj to a large extent ran on prestige and the
embodiment of this prestige was the district officer who belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS),
the ‘heaven-born service’ much vaunted as ‘the steel frame of the Raj.’
When the loyalists began to jump overboard, when prestige was rocked, when the district officer and
secretariat official left the helm, it became clear that the ship was sinking, and sinking fast. It was the
result of years of ravage wrought from two quarters — the rot within and the battering without.
Paucity of European recruits to the ICS, combined with a policy of Indianization (partly conceded in
response to popular demand), ended British domination of the ICS as early as the First World War.
By 1939 British and Indian members had achieved parity. Overall recruitment was first cut in order
to maintain this balance, and later stopped in 1943. Between 1940 and 1946, the total number of ICS
officials fell from 1201 to 939, that of British ICS officials from 587 to 429 and Indian ICS officials
from 614 to 510. By 1946, only 19 British ICS officials were available in Bengal for 65 posts. Besides,
the men coming in were no longer Oxbridge graduates from aristocratic families whose fathers and
uncles were ‘old India hands’ and who believed in the destiny of the British nation to govern the
‘child-people’ of India. They were increasingly grammar school and polytechnic boys for whom
serving the Raj was a career, not a mission. The War had compounded the problem. By 1945, war-
weariness was acute and long absences from home were telling on morale. Economic worries had
set in because of inflation. Many were due to retire, others were expected to seek premature retirement.
It was a vastly-depleted, war-weary bureaucracy, battered by the 1942 movement, that remained.
However, much more than manpower shortage, it was the coming to the fore of contradictions in
the British strategy of countering nationalism that debilitated the ICS and the Raj. The British had
relied over the years on a twin policy of conciliation and repression to contain the growing
national movement. But after the Cripps Offer of 1942, there was little left to be offered as a
concession except transfer of power — full freedom itself. But the strategy of the national movement,
of a multi-faceted struggle combining non-violent mass movement with working constitutional
reforms proved to be more than a match for them. When non-violent movements were met with
repression, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, whereas if government did not
clamp down on ‘sedition,’ or effected a truce (as in 1931 when the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed)
or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act 1935, it was seen to be too
weak to wield control and its authority and prestige were undermined. On the other hand, the
brutal repression of the 1942 movement offended the sensibilities of both liberals and loyalists. So
did the government’s refusal to release Gandhi, even when he seemed close to death during his 21
day fast in February-March 1943, and its decision to go ahead with the INA trials despite fervent
appeals from liberals and loyalists to abandon them. The friends of the British were upset when
the Government appeared to be placating its enemies — as in 1945-46, when it was believed that
the Government was wooing the Congress into a settlement and into joining the government. The
powerlessness of those in authority dismayed loyalists. Officials stood by, while the violence of
Congress speeches rent the air. This shook the faith,of the loyalists in the might of the ‘Raj.’

156 LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY