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Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)

Notes This was an illusory hope, for Jinnah was more convinced than ever that he only had to bide his
time in order to reach his goal. This is precisely what Conservative members of Parliament had
warned would happen, in the contentious debate that followed the 20th February statement.
Godfrey Nicolson had said of Cripps’ speech — ‘if ever there was a speech which was a direct
invitation to the Muslim League to stick their toes in and hold out for Pakistan, that was one.’ The
Punjab Governor, Evan Jenkins, was equally emphatic — ‘the statement will be regarded as the
prelude to the final communal showdown,’ with everyone out to ‘seize as much power as they can
— if necessary by force.’ Jenkins’ prophecy took immediate shape with the League launching civil
disobedience in Punjab and bringing down the Unionist Akali- Congress coalition ministry led by
Khizr Hayat Khan. Wavell wrote in his diary on 13th March 1947 — ‘Khizr’s resignation was
prompted largely by the statement of February 20.’
This was the situation in which Mountbatten came to India as Viceroy. He was the last Viceroy
and charged with the task of winding up the Raj by 30th June 1948. Mountbatten has claimed to
have introduced the time limit into the 20 February settlement: ‘I made the great point about it. I
had thought of the time limit, and I had great difficulty in bringing him (Attlee) upto it. I think the
time limit was fundamental. 1 believe if I’d gone out without a time limit, I’d still be there.’ This
is so obviously untrue that it should need no refutation, but Lapierre and Collins in Freedom at
Midnight and others have passed off as history Mountbatten’s self-proclamations of determining
history single-handedly. The idea of a fixed date was originally Wavell’s, 31 March 1948 being the
date by which he expected a stage of responsibility without power to set in. Attlee thought
mid-1948 should be the date aimed at. Mountbatten insisted it be a calendar date and got
30th June 1948.
Mountbatten’s claim of having plenipotentiary powers, such that he need make no reference back
to London, is equally misleading. It is true that he had more independence than the Viceroys
preceding him and his views were given due consideration by the Labour Government. Yet he
referred back to London at each stage of the evolution of his Plan, sent his aide Ismay to London
and finally went himself to get Attlee and his Cabinet to agree to the 3rd June Plan.
Mountbatten had a clear cut directive from His Majesty’s Government, he did not write his own
ticket, as he has claimed. He was directed to explore the options of unity and division till October,
1947 after which he was to advise His Majesty’s Government on the form transfer of power should
take. Here again he soon discovered that he had little real choice. The broad contours of the
scenario that was to emerge were discernible even before he came out. Mountbatten found out
within two months of his arrival that more flogging would not push the Cabinet Mission Plan
forward, it was a dead horse. Jinnah was obdurate that the Muslims would settle for nothing less
than a sovereign state. Mountbatten found himself unable to move Jinnah from this stand: ‘He
gave the impression that he was not listening. He was impossible to argue with. He was, whatever
was said, intent on his Pakistan.’
The British could keep India united only if they gave up their role as mediators trying to effect a
solution Indians had agreed upon. Unity-needed positive intervention in its favour, including
putting down communal elements with a firm hand. This they chose not to do. Attlee wrote later
— ‘We would have preferred a United India. We couldn’t get it, though we tried hard.’ They in
fact took the easy way out. A serious attempt at retaining unity would involve identifying with the
forces that wanted a unified India and countering those who opposed it. Rather than doing that,
they preferred to woo both sides into friendly collaboration with Britain on strategic and defence
issues. The British preference for a united Indian subcontinent that would be a strong ally in
Commonwealth defence was modified to two dominions, both of which would be Britain’s allies
and together serve the purpose a united India was expected to do. The poser now was, how was
friendship of both India and Pakistan to be secured?
Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. The country would be
partitioned but so would Punjab and Bengal, so that the limited Pakistan that emerged would
meet both the Congress and League’s positions to some extent. The League’s position on Pakistan
was conceded to the extent that it would be created, but the Congress position on unity would be
taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Since Congress were asked to concede

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