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Unit 9: Jeremy Bentham

in his criticism of the concepts of natural law and natural rights. Like Hume, he criticized these Notes
notions on pragmatic and conceptual levels. But, unlike Hume, he had immense faith in the power
of reason, regarding it as a guardian and director of morals. He dismissed natural law as “nothing
but a phrase”. It lacked substance.
Since law sprang from human will, law-making (like human conduct) would have to be evaluated
in its capacity to promote happiness. From this point of view, a jurist had two duties, one to find
out the effects and consequences of the existing laws on society. Second, to devise the implications
of utility in a given situation of a given society and frame rules, procedures, schemes and institutions
for actualizing these demands, and persuade sovereigns to give effect to the proposals as part of
their sanctioned commands.
On normative grounds, Bentham pointed out that natural rights impelled an individual to rise up
in arms against whatever one did not like. Talk of natural rights and natural law, he contended,
was like using “terrorist language”. It incited a “spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of resistance
against all governments” encouraging chaos and disorder. On a conceptual plane, he dismissed
the notion of natural rights as mischievous and “simply nonsense upon stilts”, for “there is no
such thing as natural rights opposed to, in contradiction to legal” (Bentham 1965: 500, 501).
Bentham dismissed natural rights as nonsense for two reasons. First, they did not mean anything.
His dismissal of natural rights as meaningless was similar to the arguments of the Vienna Circle
when they claimed that theology and metaphysics lacked meaning (Waldron 1987: 34). Second,
the sentences of the natural rights text guaranteed their falsity. Like Hobbes, he was insistent that
words be defined precisely and clearly, for ambiguity and confusion contributed to much of the
conflicts in politics. Accordingly, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1791) was purported
to be the penning of a:
... cluster of truths on which the fate of nations was to hang, was in fact written more
like an oriental tale or an allegory for a magazine... it contains stale epigrams, trite
sentimental conceits and flippery ornaments rather than necessary destinations and
the majestic simplicity of good sound sense.
Bentham regarded the principles of the Declaration as fallacious but not pernicious, as Burke did.
Interestingly, like Burke who sympathized with the cause of the American colonies, Bentham too
was less harsh on the American Declaration of Independence (1776). Both favoured change without
undermining security, continuity and order. Neither was Bentham enamoured of Paine’s logical
defence of the Revolution. Bentham rejected natural rights and natural laws because of his conviction
that every aspect of social phenomena could be calculated and measured mathematically by an
expert and skillful legislator, becoming an instrument of happiness.
Like Burke, Bentham believed that rights were to be protected by existing laws, but he differed
from Burke in his perception of English law. Unlike Burke, he was not so reverential about English
law just because it was an “ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs”. Law, according
to Bentham, had to be codified, simple, systematic and logical, based on the principle of the
“greatest happiness of the greatest number”.
Bentham’s objections to natural rights was both philosophical and political. As a legal positivist of
the command school Bentham could accept that statements about natural rights were even
meaningful... . Rights were co-related with duties and to be under a duty was to be liable to
sanctions in the event of failure to perform an action... . Bentham’s political objection to natural
rights was that they were in fact reactionary, and that their alleged existence retarded the application
of science to social reform.
Interestingly, even though Bentham undermined the sanctity of natural rights formulations, he
recognized the importance of rights as being crucial for the security of the individual. He rejected
not only the idea of natural and inviolable right to property, but also the idea of absolute right to

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