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Unit 8: Constitutional Structure: Legislature

necessary that the President must send a message to the Parliament specifying conditions which Notes
motivated him to make use of his emergency powers. The President cannot dissolve the National
Assembly during the state of emergency, nor can he dissolve it until it has enjoyed a life of at least
one year. The Parliament can exercise control over the foreign policy of the President by the negative
means of censuring the Government. Finally, it is provided that the Parliament shall authorise the
declaration of war and the prorogation of martial law (though decreed in the meeting of the Council
of Ministers) shall be authorised by it alone after the period of 12 years.
It is easy to form an impression that the authority of the French Parliament is of a very attenuated
kind. It appears that serious arrangements have been devised to keep the legislature in a position
weaker than that of the executive
Special Features: An account of the functions and powers of the legislature highlights the fact that
French Parliament is not a very strong organ of the national government if its authority is compared
with that of the executive under the President. The Parliament is not at all a sovereign law-making
body like its British counterpart, nor is it as powerful as the American Congress working within the
legislative arena earmarked by the Constitution according to the system of separation of powers and
checks and balances. Its authority neither resembles the legislature of a parliamentary government
where the executive can be out-voted by the popular chamber by a resolution passed by simple
majority, nor does it look akin to the powers of a legislature organised on the principle of presidential
model where the law-making organ of the government has freedom to operate within its allotted
‘legislative sphere,’ what to say of a legislature modelled on the convention theory where the
government runs according to the will of the deputies elected by the people.
That the new Constitution places the Parliament under the subservience of the executive (Government)
is evident from following main points.
1. The Government does not depend upon the reckless behaviour of the legislature as it was in the
past. Nothing but a censure motion passed by the National Assembly with its absolute majority
(signed by at least 1/10 of its total membership) is required to throw out the Government. It is
hardly conceivable that the Government would be thrown out by the simple majority of the
House in case a motion of confidence initiated by the Prime Minister falls through. The system
of ‘interpellation’ is no more in existence to facilitate the task of the indignant legislators to
defeat a Government for no other reason than to satisfy their political hunger for ministerial
rewards. Moreover, the right to dissolve the National Assembly is the most formidable weapon
in the hands of the President of the Republic to create fear in the minds of the ambitious and
irresponsible deputies.
2. The enhancement of the powers of the Senate has gone to the benefit of the Goverment at the
expense of the authority of the National Assembly. It is provided that a bill must be passed by
both the houses and in the event of disagreement, it is the Government which shall take the
initiative of either calling a joint meeting of the two houses through a conference committee in
order to settle the dispute, or it may ask for the reconsideration of the bill by the National
Assembly and thereby override the veto of the Senate in case the bill is passed by the Assembly.
Every situation seems to go to the benefit of the executive when there is a difference of opinion
between the two houses. It is the Government that alone can end a deadlock between the two
houses either by calling them to reconsider the bill in question, or by asking the National
Assembly (if the difference persists) to pass the bill and thereby over-ride the veto of the Senate.
3. There is Constitutional Council—an extra-legislative body—to sit over the head of the legislature.
Not only the sphere of legislation is restricted where the Parliament can operate: more serious
is the provision that the Constitutional Council would (particularly at the initiative of the
Government) prevent the Parliament from ‘over-stepping’ its powers. It is laid down in the
Constitution that all organic laws, prior to their promulgation, must be deemed constitutional
by this extra-legislative (mainly judicial) body. It is also stipulated that in the event of difference
of opinion on the bill regarding its constitutional validity, the matter is to be settled neither by
the Presidents of the two Houses nor by the Government but by the Constitutional Council.

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