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Unit 12: Politics of Representation and Participation

voting procedure—real managerial authority often resided not with the popularly elected village Notes
committee but with the village Communist Party branch. Fifteen years after passage of the draft law,
too little is known to generalize about overall progress in village elections, its determinants, or its
consequences. Certainly, to the degree that the practices of grassroots democracy acquire the force of
routine and expectations accumulate, however slowly, among nearly 900 million Chinese in more
than 900,000 villages, political participation in the countryside will change profoundly. The 1998
version of the law cautioned against a liberal democratic understanding of where this process is
meant to lead, however. A newly added article asserts the role of the Communist Party (not noted in
the 1987 draft) in guaranteeing that village committees exercise their democratic functions.
Officially Unacceptable Political Participation

More dramatic than the reforms that have redefined officially acceptable political participation has
been the political action of ordinary Chinese in city streets and squares beginning in the late 1970s.
With strikes, marches, posters, petitions, and occupation of public spaces, ordinary citizens have
acted as if political reform comprehended or condoned mass political action and public disorder. The
official record suggests the contrary, however. In 1980, the right to post “big-character posters” (usually
criticisms of leaders, written by individuals or groups and posted on walls), introduced during the
Cultural Revolution, was removed from the Chinese constitution, and in 1982 the constitutional right
to strike was rescinded. As for mass protests, the official view was made clear in 1979 with the
introduction of the “four fundamental principles” that political participation must uphold: (1) the
socialist road, (2) Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, (3) the people’s democratic dictatorship,
and (4) the leadership of the Communist Party. Of these principles, only the last is necessary to
restrict political participation effectively, as the content of the first three has become what party
leaders make of it. Participants (especially organizers) face real risks of physical harm and criminal
punishment. Why then did ordinary citizens engage in mass protests with increasing frequency in
the 1970s and 1980s? Why has urban worker and peasant unrest-increased in the 1980s and 1990s?
Different sorts of “officially unacceptable” political participation have different explanations, but
none can be explained without reference to the post-Mao reforms. On the one hand, economic reforms
have produced some socially unacceptable outcomes: more (and more visible) inflation,
unemployment, crime, and corruption, for example. Rural unrest has typically been triggered by
local corruption and exaction of excessive (often illegal) taxes and fees. Peasant unrest sparked by
these sorts of problems is by no means uncommon. Urban unrest— strikes, slowdowns, and
demonstrations—has increased too, as state enterprises struggle to survive in the socialist market
economy. Many enterprises have engaged in massive layoffs; others have been unable to pay bonuses
and pensions. For the first time since 1949, many urban Chinese have been living on fixed incomes,
no incomes, or unpredictable incomes as the cost of living increases. Since the beginning of industrial
reform in the mid-1980s, the threat of urban unrest due to inflation and unemployment has consistently
constrained plans of China’s leaders to shut down large loss-making state enterprises.
In 1989, a different sort of urban unrest captured the attention of the world news media and,
consequently, of the world. The demonstration that brought a million people to Tiananmen Square
was the third major political protest movement since Mao’s death. The first was in 1978-1979, the
second in 1986-1987. All three differed fundamentally from the mass campaigns of the Maoist years,
all were officially unacceptable, all were linked in some important way to official reforms and
reformers, and all ended in failure for mass protesters (and resulted in setbacks to official reforms
too).
Despite links between protesters and official reformers, the post-Mao movements were not mass
mobilization campaigns. As they were not explicitly initiated by the regime, once underway they
could not be easily stopped with an official pronouncement from the political center. Instead, the
authorities turned to coercive force wielded by the police, the armed police, and ultimately the army
to terminate the protests with violence. The protests were officially unacceptable. This had less to do
the substance of their demands than with their form of expression. The official consensus since
December 1978 has been that the most important priority for China is economic growth, with social
order and stability as prerequisites for growth. Mass protests are distinctly disorderly. Further, as a

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