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Unit 10 : Political Economy of Non-tariff Barriers : and Their Applications



        A model of non-tariff barriers to trade                                                   Notes
        Our initial model, then, is :
                                             (
                                                  ⋅
         NTB t + 1 =  AB SIZE+  1  t  +  B 2  (logCONST ) + BSIZE logCONST ) + (1)
                                            3
                                                             t
                                         t
                                                    (
                 BUNEM +   B 5 (UNEM log CONST⋅  )  +  BUNEM SIZE log CONST⋅  ⋅  ) t
                  4
                                                   6
                        t
                                              t
                 +B REER t  + B 8 (REER log CONST ) + B 9
                                   ⋅
                   7
                                              t
                 (REER SIZE log CONST⋅  ⋅  ) +  B TARIFF +  t . e
                                         10
                                                 t
                                      t
        The dependent variable,  NTB t + 1  , is the proportion of imports subject to NTBs in each state in year t
        + 1 based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) “inventory
        list” of NTBs. As Sam Laird and Alexander Yeats observe, this list includes “Variable import levies
        and product specific charges (excluding tariff quotas); Quotas; Prohibitions (including seasonal
        prohibitions) : non-automatic import authorisations including restrictive import licensing
        requirements; quantitative ‘voluntary’ export restraints; and trade restraints under the Multifibre
        Arrangement.” It is, of course, difficult to gauge the extent of NTB protection within or across states.
        Unlike tariffs, NTBs have no natural measure of intensity, and calculations of advalorem equivalents
        of NTBs have proven to be unreliable. Some analysts have treated NTBs as a dichotomous variable
        based on whether or not a given sector is protected by them. Others have estimated the level of NTBs
        based on the difference between the predicted and observed openness of an economy.
        In contrast to these approaches, we examine the incidence of NTBs. This measure is chosen because
        the UNCTAD trade coverage ratios are viewed by many experts as the most reliable estimates of
        NTBs across states and because it is the most appropriate variable with which to test our theory. For
        example, polities characterized by many (and therefore small) parliamentary constituencies may be
        especially prone to pork-barrel politics. Under these conditions, logrolling is likely to be pervasive
        and the preferences of many different interest groups are therefore likely to be reflected in trade
        policy. Since the extent and variety of interest-group demands reflected in trade policy bear directly
        on the incidence of protection, we focus on explaining the incidence of NTBs. The coverage ratios
        that we analyze measure the proportion of a state’s imports that are subject to NTBs.
        Turning to the independent variables, SIZE  is the economic size of each state in year t. It was pointed
                                          t
        out earlier that both the ratio of national imports to total global imports and the ratio of national GDP
        to global GDP are used to measure relative state size. Thus, we estimate the parameters in equation
        (1) using both variables. In addition, log CONST  is the natural logarithm of the number of
                                                  t
        parliamentary constituencies in each state in year  t based on Rogowski’s data; UNEM   is the
                                                                                  t
        unemployment rate in each state in year t; REER  is an index of the real exchange rate in each state in
                                              t
        year t; TARIFF  is the average national post-Tokyo Round offer rate for each state; and e  is an error
                                                                              t
                    t
        term. The remaining variables are included in order to determine whether, as we hypothesized above,
        the interaction between factors that regulate the provision of protection (SIZE· log CONST), and the
        interaction between factors that govern demands for protection and those that regulate its supply,
        are important determinants of cross-national patterns of NTBs.
        Data limitations led us to focus on explaining NTBs in 1983 and 1986. UNCTAD provides data on
        NTBs for fourteen advanced industrial states in these years. The fourteen states are : Belgium-
        Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
        Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Although UNCTAD also
        provides NTB data for New Zealand, our results indicated that this country was a statistical outlier.
        We therefore excluded New Zealand and focus on the aforementioned fourteen states in the following
        analysis. Because NTBs are measured in 1983 and 1986 (years t + 1), the independent variables in
        equation (1) (except for TARIFF) are measured in 1982 and 1985 (years t). The observations for 1983
        and 1986 are initially pooled; however, the extent to which the incidence of NTBs varied between
        1983 and 1986 is also examined below.



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