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Notes ordinary propositions about objects, causal relations, the self, and so on, are semantically equivalent
to propositions about one’s experiences.
Many commentators have since rejected this understanding of Humean empiricism, stressing an
epistemological, rather than a semantic reading of his project. According to this view, Hume’s
empiricism consisted in the idea that it is our knowledge, and not our ability to conceive, that is
restricted to what can be experienced. To be sure, Hume thought that we can form beliefs about
that which extends beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as
custom and the imagination, but he was skeptical about claims to knowledge on this basis.
Induction
Few philosophers are as associated with induction as David Hume; but Hume himself rarely used
the term and when he did, he used it to support a point he was arguing. He made no indication
that he saw any problem with induction. Induction became associated with Hume only in the
early twentieth century; John Maynard Keynes may have been the first to draw the connection.
The connection is now standard, but is based on what current scholars mean by “induction”, not
how Hume used the term in his writings.
The cornerstone of Hume’s epistemology is the problem of induction. This may be the area of
Hume’s thought where his scepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.
Understanding the problem of induction is central to grasping Hume’s philosophical system.
The problem concerns the explanation of how we are able to make inductive inferences. Inductive
inference is reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved;
as Hume says, it is a question of how things behave when they go “beyond the present testimony
of the senses, and the records of our memory”. Hume notices that we tend to believe that things
behave in a regular manner; i.e., that patterns in the behaviour of objects will persist into the
future, and throughout the unobserved present. This persistence of regularities is sometimes called
Uniformitarianism or the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.
Hume’s argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be
uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties, and both of these are inadequate. The two
sorts are: (1) demonstrative reasoning, and (2) probable reasoning. With regard to (1), Hume
argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is “consistent and conceivable”
that nature might stop being regular. Turning to (2), Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature
will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past, as this is using the very sort of
reasoning (induction) that is under question: it would be circular reasoning. Thus no form of

justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences.
Hume’s solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the
human ability to make inductive inferences. He asserts that “Nature, by an absolute and
uncontroulable [sic] necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel”. Although
many modern commentators have demurred from Hume’s solution, some have notably concurred
with it, seeing his analysis of our epistemic predicament as a major contribution to the theory of
knowledge. For example, philosopher John D. Kenyon writes:
Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference
just for a moment in the study, but the forces of nature will soon overcome that artificial skepticism,
and the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile
suspension of belief.
Causation
The notion of causation is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we
reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association
that is the basis of our concept of causation. There are three main interpretations of Hume’s theory

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