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Notes Practical Reason
Hume’s anti-rationalism informed much of his theory of belief and knowledge, in his treatment of
the notions of induction, causation, and the external world. But it was not confined to this sphere,
and permeated just as strongly his theories of motivation, action, and morality. In a famous
sentence in the Treatise, Hume circumscribes reason’s role in the production of action: Reason is,
and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them. It has been suggested that this position can be lucidly brought out through
the metaphor of “direction of fit”: beliefs—the paradigmatic products of reason—are propositional
attitudes that aim to have their content fit the world; conversely, desires—or what Hume calls
passions, or sentiments—are states that aim to fit the world to their contents. Though a metaphor,
it has been argued that this intuitive way of understanding Hume’s theory that desires are necessary
for motivation “captures something quite deep in our thought about their nature”. Hume’s anti-
rationalism has been very influential, and defended in contemporary philosophy of action by neo-
Humeans such as Michael Smithand Simon Blackburn. The major opponents of the Humean view

are cognitivists about what it is to act for a reason, such as John McDowell, and Kantians, such as
Christine Korsgaard.
Ethics
Is–ought problem Hume’s views on human motivation and action formed the cornerstone of his
ethical theory: he conceived moral or ethical sentiments to be intrinsically motivating, or the
providers of reasons for action. Given that one cannot be motivated by reason alone, requiring the
input of the passions, Hume argued that reason cannot be behind morality.
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this
particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. Hume’s sentimentalism
about morality was shared by his close friend Adam Smith, and Hume and Smith were mutually
influenced by the moral reflections of Francis Hutcheson.
Hume’s theory of ethics has been influential in modern day metaethical theory, helping to inspire

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various forms of emotivism,error theory and ethical expressivism and non-cognitivism and
Allan Gibbard.
Free Will, Determinism, and Responsibility
Hume, along with Thomas Hobbes, is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of freedom

and determinism.The thesis of compatibilism seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist
belief that human beings are part of a deterministic universe, whose happenings are governed by
the laws of physics.
Hume argued that the dispute about the compatibility of freedom and determinism has been kept
afloat by ambiguous terminology: From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long
kept on foot... we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the expression. Hume defines
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the concepts of “necessity” and “liberty” as follows:
Necessity: “the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are
constantly conjoined together..” Liberty: “a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations
of the will. Hume then argues that, according to these definitions, not only are the two compatible,
but Liberty requires Necessity. For if our actions were not necessitated in the above sense, they
would “...have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that one does
not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other.” But if our actions are not thus
hooked up to the will, then our actions can never be free: they would be matters of “chance; which
is universally allowed not to exist”.
Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that in order to be held morally responsible, it is required that
our behaviour be caused, i.e. necessitated, for Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and

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