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Introduction to Artificial Intelligence & Expert Systems




                    Notes          Dutch Book Approach
                                   The Dutch book argument was proposed by de Finetti, and is based on betting. A Dutch book is
                                   made when a clever gambler places a set of bets that guarantee a profit, no matter what the
                                   outcome of the bets. If a bookmaker follows the rules of the Bayesian calculus in the construction
                                   of his odds, a Dutch book cannot be made.
                                   However, Ian Hacking noted that traditional Dutch book arguments did not specify Bayesian
                                   updating: they left open the possibility that non-Bayesian updating rules could avoid Dutch
                                   books. For example, Hacking writes” And neither the Dutch book argument, nor any other in
                                   the personalist arsenal of proofs of the probability axioms, entails the dynamic assumption. Not
                                   one entails Bayesianism. So the personalist requires the dynamic assumption to be Bayesian. It
                                   is true that in consistency a personalist could abandon the Bayesian model of learning from
                                   experience. Salt could lose its savour.”

                                       !
                                     Caution There are non-Bayesian updating rules that also avoid Dutch books. The additional
                                     hypotheses sufficient to (uniquely) specify Bayesian updating are substantial, complicated,
                                     and unsatisfactory.

                                   Decision Theory Approach

                                   A decision-theoretic justification of the use of Bayesian inference (and hence of Bayesian
                                   probabilities) was given by Abraham Wald, who proved that every admissible statistical
                                   procedure is either a Bayesian procedure or a limit of Bayesian procedures. Conversely, every
                                   Bayesian procedure is admissible.

                                   7.1.3 An Alternative to Bayes: The Stanford Certainty Factor Algebra

                                   It is a more general approach to representing uncertainty than the Bayesian approach. Particularly
                                   useful when decision to be made is based on the amount of evidence that has been collected. It
                                   is appropriate for combining expert opinions, since experts do differ in their opinions with a
                                   certain degree of ignorance. This Approach distinguishes between uncertainty and ignorance by
                                   creating belief functions. This also assumes that the sources of information to be combined are
                                   statistically independent. The basic idea in representing uncertainty in this model is:
                                   Set up a confidence interval – an interval of probabilities within which the true probability lies
                                   with a certain confidence – based on the Belief B and plausibility PL provided by some evidence
                                   E for a proposition P.
                                   MB and MD can be tied together
                                   CF(H|E) = MB(H|E) - MD(H|E)
                                   As CF approaches 1 the confidence for H is stronger
                                   As CF approaches -1 the confidence against H is stronger
                                   As CF approaches 0 there is little support for belief or disbelief in H

                                   A basic probability m(S), a belief BELIEF(S) and a plausible belief PLAUSIBILITY(S) all have
                                   value in the interval [0,1].

                                   Combining Beliefs

                                   To combine multiple sources of evidence to a single (or multiple) hypothesis do the following:
                                   Suppose M  and M  are two belief functions. Let X be the set of subsets of W to which M  assigns
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