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Unit 13: Oligopoly




                                                                                                Notes
                                             Table 13.1


















          The equilibrium values of Q  and Q  are found in the following way:
                                      y
                                 x
          Q   = [1/2–1/8–1/32 ...]OD
            x
             = [1/2–1/2 (1/4)–1/2(1/4) ...]OD
                                  2
             = [1/2–1/2 [(1/4+(1/4) +(1/4) ....]OD
                               2
                                     3
             = 1/2–1/2 [(1/4)/(1–1/4)]OD
             = (1/2–1/6)OD
             = (1/3)OD
             \ Equilibrium Q  = (1/3) OD
                          x
          Q   = 1/4+1/16+1/64 ....)OD
            y
             = [(1/4+(1/4) +(1/4)  ....]OD
                             3
                        2
             = [(1/4)/(1–1/4)]OD
             = (1/3)OD
             Equilibrium Q  = (1/3)OD
                        y
          Hence the total equilibrium output of the two duopolists X and Y is (Q  + Q ) = 1/3 OD + 1/3
                                                                        y
                                                                    x
          OD = 2/3 OD.
          Since OD = competitive output, the duopoly equilibrium output is 2/3 of competitive output,
          and the equilibrium output of each duopolist is = 1/3 of competitive output.
          We can write 2/3 as = (2) / (2+1) and 1/3 as = 1/(2+1), where 2 is the number of sellers in
          duopoly.

          Extending this duopoly case to oligopoly with the number of firms (sellers) to be N, we can say
          that according to the Curnot model, the equilibrium output of each of the N oligopolists is = 1/

          (N+1) X competitive output. And total equilibrium output of N oligopolistic firms is = N / (N+1)
          X competitive output
          A Mathematical Version of Cournot’s Model

          Assume that the market demand facing the duopolists is:
                                            X = a*+b*P
          or

                                          P = a+bX     b < 0



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