Page 195 - DCAP309_INFORMATION_SECURITY_AND_PRIVACY

Unit 13: Privacy Technological Impacts

parties information regarding objects carried by individuals without their information. It might Notes
permit inferences allowing links to more information on the individual and more accurate
profiling.

Example: Inferences completed from numerous tags carried by an individual or from
sensitive data, like biometrics in an unsecured RFID passport, or from tagged medicines.
Such a scenario would need the occurrence of readers in the tags’ environment in addition to the
capacity for the third party to convert the objects’ tag information into meaningful data. Likewise,
tracking in real time or after the fact may be the major functionality of RFID that raises issues.
Particularly, due to the invisibility of the technology, tracking of individuals could take place
without their knowledge, if they are provided with hidden tags or tags that are not sufficiently
secured. In other cases, tracking people could also be the purpose of the RFID application (e.g.
tracking children in an amusement park). Another apprehension is that interoperable (“open
loop”) RFID technologies make possible and as a result multiply the collection and processing
of personal information. Invasive RFID taking benefit of interoperability and ever-present
Internet connectivity is often described as a predictable future, although there are currently few
instances of open loop systems. In cases where RFID systems collect data which is connected
with an identified or identifiable individual, the OECD Privacy Guidelines offer a useful
framework. When an RFID system processes personal data, transparency of the function of the
processing and consent of individuals are necessary. Beyond fundamental data protection
information, privacy observe may usefully comprise additional information like:
1. The existence of the tags,

2. Their content, use and control,
3. The presence of readers,
4. The reading activity,
5. The ability to disable tags, and

6. Where to obtain assistance.
Innovative means of informing individuals competently could be discovered. Continued
stakeholder dialogue among stakeholders, across sectors and in each of the particular application
areas, would help elucidate or reach a consensus on what information to offer to individuals, the
best means to converse it to attain efficient transparency, in addition to the cases where consent
should be or not be needed. Naturally, security safeguards are necessary for the defense of
privacy in RFID systems.

The broad variety of technical configurations and use scenarios make privacy impact assessments
a good practice for identifying and accepting privacy risks and best approaches to mitigate them
in a specified system. As for protection, since RFID systems are often components of broader
information systems, it cannot be predictable that all privacy challenges can be solved at the
RFID level. A holistic method to privacy management may be tinted as a good practice. Such an
approach would regard all the components of the information systems implicated, besides the
core RFID components in addition to the whole life cycle of the tag when it remains useful
beyond the reach of the data controller. The option of the RFID technology to be used in a system
influences the defense of privacy just as it impacts the security of the system. Privacy by design
or embedding privacy in the design of the technology and of the systems can considerably help
the protection of privacy and promote trust in RFID systems. Strategies to offer incentives to
industry and business for scheming and using RFID technologies that comprise sufficient privacy
protections could be pursued. Yet, as for security, privacy protection should not solely depend
on technical dimensions but instead on a mix of technical and non-technical safeguards. Some

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