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Unit 13: Private Label Brands




          where it has been imperative for retailers to create a persuasive consumer connection. In order  Notes
          to accomplish this objective, retailers have had to elevate themselves above competitive retail
          outlets by having a comprehensive offer. They would develop their portfolios and provide
          proprietary products in categories where national brand manufacturers’ offerings did not suffice.
          Perhaps the strongest success story in this regard was that of the Marks & Spencer brand in the
          late 1980s and early 1990s. This was a clothing retailer known for good basics that complemented
          its offering with proprietary branded food products. Quality was the cornerstone of the food
          product range and the only brand provided was its proprietary label. Mainstream retailers
          could neither emulate Marks & Spencer’s premium quality, nor its price.




             Did u know?  In 1998, Marks & Spencer became the first British retailer to make a pre-tax
             profit of over £1 billion.
          A key learning from this retailer’s situation is that it grew its private label brand according to
          the industry’s traditional approach and failed to build proprietary products on the platform of
          a real consumer need. As a result, it has been forced to look elsewhere to fill these needs. It has
          reversed its limited value private label strategy to invite Starbucks to run its coffee shop, Yo
          Sushi (a well-known High Street sushi brand) to provide ready-meal sushi. The retailer has a
          licensing relationship with popular chef, Jamie Oliver, borrowing from his expertise and charisma
          in food and cooking to increase sales volume and interest. While this overall strategy is far more
          consumer driven, it has abdicated the advantage to the competition who, through their successful
          customer-focused private label brand development, have much more profitable relationships
          with manufacturers.

          It is conceivable that retailers who reached this point were taking private label success for
          granted and not being fully cognizant of the resounding long-term impact of their private label
          brand  development. The  fact  that  they were  providing branded  products  that  emulated
          manufacturers’ product in terms of quality and price and at the same time were delivering much
          better margins fueled their portfolio expansion. Yet, for some this heralded the beginning of the
          end of the traditionally branded good. There was, it seemed, nothing that could not be privately
          labeled. A proprietary branding phenomenon that had started in limited product categories like
          fresh produce had expanded out to cake mixes, cookies, pet food, pharmacies, coffee shops, and
          even, financial services.
          Meanwhile, Tesco, Sainsbury’s nearest rival had been developing its offer using a different tack:
          carefully segmented private label echelons and ranges. Tesco has a value selection for cheaper
          commodities categories. Yet, this value brand was not manifested as the generic, store brand of
          the past. The critical point of difference with these products is that they are defined less by which
          manufacturer gave the retailer an opportunity in a certain product category and more by what
          a working class family on a tight budget would need to get by.

          Concurrently, Tesco created an organics line, a kid’s line and, perhaps most impressively, the
          Tesco Finest sub-brand. Tesco Finest started in ready meals and chilled foods, where the retailer
          has a natural advantage (these products are difficult to prepare and distribute). Integral to its
          success was its very high premiumness. The exceptional price and quality were well received by
          the higher end consumer. It was also evident that Tesco Finest was an encompassing proposition
          and could stretch into other categories. But rather than trying to rule the world, Tesco selectively
          ventured into those specific areas where it could add value.
          High-end cookie tins, which are popular Christmas gifts, are a good example. Tesco was smart
          to recognize that manufacturers were struggling to add value in this seasonal, yet, premium
          playing field because branded products deemed suitable for everyday consumption dominated
          the category. Tesco Finest was able to compete here because, as a brand, it had more permission




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