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Manu Sharma, Lovely Professional University Unit 12: Border Conflict with China

Unit 12: Border Conflict with China Notes

CONTENTS
Objectives
Introduction
12.1 Border Conflict with China
12.2 The 1962 Chinese Attack
12.3 Summary
12.4 Key-Words
12.5 Review Questions
12.6 Further Readings

Objectives

After studying this unit students will be able to:
• Discuss Border Conflict with China

Introduction
China and its neighbours have long been involved in a number of border disputes, many of them
dating back to the end of World War II or the Civil War that followed. Asserting Chinese sovereignty
over borderlands in contention—everywhere from Tibet to Taiwan to the South China Sea—has
long been the top priority for Chinese nationalists, an obsession that overrides all other concerns.
Tensions over those conflicts rose sharply in the late summer of 2010, complicating China’s attempts
to present the country’s rise as a booj for the whole region. The disputes have also handed the
United States an opportunity to reassert itself—one the Obama administration has been keen to
take advantage of, potentially creating wedges between China and its neighbors.
In the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China seized a Switzerland-sized area, Aksai Chin (Aksayqin), and
overran Arunachal Pradesh (an Indian state the size of Austria). There are also other, smaller
pockets of disputed area. The PRC withdrew from virtually all of Arunachal Pradesh to the Line
of Actual Control (LAC), which approximates the McMahon Line that is found in a 1914 agreement
initialed by British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives. Chinese and Indian forces clashed in the
Sumdorong Chu valley of Arunachal Pradesh in 1986-87. Relations began to thaw in 1988.
On 7th September, 1993, China and India signed an accord to reduce tensions along their border
and to respect the LAC. During November, 1996, China and India agreed to delimit the LAC and
institute confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the frontier. The agreement pledged
nonaggression, prior notification of large troop movements, a 10 km no-fly zone for combat aircraft,
and exchange of maps to resolve disagreements about the precise location of the LAC. In August
1997 the sides ratified the CBM agreement. There seems to have been little substantive progress,
except for a series of high-level visits. The most recent, on 27th April, was the first visit by a PRC
Chief of Staff to India. However, two weeks before the visit the new Indian Defense Minister,
George Fernandes, accused the PRC of repeated violations of Indian territory, including the
construction of a helipad on “Indian” territory in the disputed zone, and of aiding Pakistan’s
nuclear and missile programs. On 3rd May he publicly labeled China as India’s number one threat
and alleged that the PRC was stockpiling nuclear weapons in Tibet, expanding naval activity off
the Burmese coast, and conducting surveillance against India from Burma’s Coco Islands. After
the visit of General Fu Quanyou and PRC protests, Fernandes said that his characterisation of
China as India’s troops along the frontier with China would not be reduced. Such a statement calls
into question part of the agreed CBMs. China and India have yet to address their fundamental and

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