Page 200 - DHIS204_DHIS205_INDIAN_FREEDOM_STRUGGLE_HINDI

Unit 12: Border Conflict with China

restored the sense of self-worth. Nehru never really recovered from the blow, and his death in May Notes
1964 was most likely hastened by it. Worse, at the pinnacle of his outstanding career, he had to face
attacks from political opponents who would never have dared otherwise. He was forced to sacrifice
Krishna Menon, his long-time associate and then Defence Minister. The policy of non-alignment,
which he had nurtured with such care, seemed for a while unlikely to be able to withstand the body-
blow delivered by a friend. The irony was that it was derailed by a Socialist country and not by a
capitalist power. Right-wing forces and pro-West elements loudly criticized Nehru. They used the
opportunity to block a constitutional amendment aimed at strengthening land ceiling legislation.
The Third Plan was badly affected and resources had to be diverted for defence.

The Congress lost three parliamentary by elections-in a row and Nehru faced in
August 1963 the first noconfidence motion of his life.

India’s relations with other countries were powerfully affected by the Chinese attack, as the
‘China factor’ loomed large in foreign policy. The US and the UK had responded positively with
help in the crisis, so they could not be shrugged off once it receded.
He understood that the Chinese occupation of Tibet meant a common border with attendant
conflicts. But he also saw that China could not think of expansionism as yet, as it had big problems
to solve. After the revolt in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama’s arrival, and the border clashes, he was well
aware of the dangers, but what good would it have done to threaten China ? In an effort to
checkmate the Chinese he did make diplomatic preparations, by moving closer to the Soviets. He
had never bought the line that Communist China and Communist USSR would team up, and
perhaps along with Indian Communists, threaten the Indian state. He did not believe that China
was a tool in the hands of the Soviets, nor did he make the mistake of thinking that the Soviet
Union would back Communist brothers against Indian friends, as many in India argued.
Nehru was shocked at the scale of the attack, as he had thought that there may be occassional
border skirmishes here and there, but not an invasion of this nature. He erred in not anticipating
the precise nature of the attack, rather than in the foreign policy he pursued. A further mistake
was the panic in appealing to the US and UK for help, as next day the Chinese withdrew.
Irresponsible attacks on Nehru by sections of the Press, the Opposition parties, and even members
of his own party had led to this knee-jerk response.. The failure of nerve on the battlefield was
compounded by that in the country at large with Nehru rather than the Chinese becoming the butt
of attack! Sadly, the country showed an inability to face adversity stoically, with faith in its proven
leaders, and instead fell into despair and mutual recrimination. To his credit, Nehru tried his best
to retrieve the situation and get the country back to its bearings.
Most commentators are now agreed that India’s defeat at China’s hands in 1962 was not the result
of Nehru’s naive faith in Chinese friendship and Utopian pacifism and consequent neglect of India’s
defence preparedness. On the contrary, between 1949-50 and 1962, the strength of the Indian Armed
Forces doubled from 280,000 to 550,000 and that of the Indian Air Force from seven combat squadrons
in 1947 to nineteen by 1962. The war with Pakistan in 1965 was fought with the same equipment and
no debacle occurred. Nehru was well aware and had been warning of the possibilities of border
clashes with the Chinese since 1959. But neither the political nor the military leadership anticipated
the precise nature of the Chinese attack, and were therefore taken by surprise. Apparently, the
military leadership thought in terms of either border clashes or a full-scale war in the plains of
Assam, but not about the possibility of a limited deep thrust and withdrawal. The Chief of Staff,
General Thimayya, believed that a total war with China was unthinkable because China would have
full Soviet support. He and other senior officers do not appear to have been aware of Sino-Soviet
differences. Nor does he seem to have conceived of a role for the Air Force ‘at a time when the Indian
Air Force could have swept the skies over Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet without any opposition
from the Chinese. (Nehru asked the US for an air cover without consulting his own Air Force.)

LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY 195