Page 201 - DHIS204_DHIS205_INDIAN_FREEDOM_STRUGGLE_HINDI

Indian Freedom Struggle (1707–1947 A.D.)

Notes The failure was also, it is felt, due to the lack of a proper system of higher defence command and
management, and because there was no system of defence planning, and the structure of civil-
military relations was flawed. The chiefs of staff were not integrated into the civilian policy-
making structure, but remained theatre commanders preparing for the near-term future but not
for the long-term future security environment. Despite Nehru’s warnings since 1959, of trouble
with China, much professional thought had not gone into the planning for a war in the Himalayas.
It was a failure of logistics, of intelligence, or rather of analysis of intelligence, of coordination of
different wings such as the army with the Air Force, etc. It was a failure of nerve on the part of the
military commander, who had an excellent record and had been decorated earlier, but withdrew
without a fight, though it is believed he could have held out for at least seven days. The Chinese,
on their part, withdrew as quickly as they came, having achieved their objective of humiliating
India by a quick but limited thrust deep into Indian territory. Again, the Indian side had failed to
anticipate the Chinese withdrawal and had now begun planning to face a full-scale war in the
plains of Assam.
Maxwell’s theory of Indian aggressiveness is not treated seriously by most experts, as it is too
obvious that India had no inkling, leave alone intentions, of provoking a conflict. Her prime
minister and Defence Minister were out of the country, the chief of staff on leave, a senior
commander on a cruise. What was India to gain from provoking a war anyway ? On the contrary,
it can be shown that it was Chinese imperatives, of which Maxwell shows no awareness, that
brought them to war, not Indian provocation. And the factors that propelled China in the direction
of conflict were beyond Nehru’s control.
Take Tibet. Every strong Chinese government had tried to integrate Tibet. But Tibet wanted
independence. Nevertheless, Nehru accepted the Chinese position on Tibet in the 1954 Panch
Sheel agreement without even getting a quid pro quo on the border, which was possibly a mistake.
Only in 1959 did Chou Enlai claim territory in Ladakh and NEFA, this is in the wake of the
Khampa revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India with many refugees. China accused India
of instigating the Dalai Lama and objected to the asylum. No Indian government could have
refused asylum and India did not instigate the rebellion. Nehru did not allow a Tibetan government-
in-exile, or any political activities. But he could not have prevented the Tibetan revolt!
Nor could Nehru succeed, despite his best efforts, in influencing US policy. The US refusal to
accommodate China, her insistence that Formosa (later Taiwan) was the only legitimate China,
which also meant that Communist China was denied a seat in the UN Security Council the attempt
to checkmate her in Korea, and IndoChina, frustrated her and pushed her on the path to aggressive
assertion. In fact, the US played no small role in making China paranoid about security and
helping the extremist left elements to come to the fore in China.
The Chinese were also upset that Afro-Asian countries were following India’s line of seeking
friendship and assistance from both the USSR and the US, rather than the Chinese line of keeping
a distance from both. By reducing India’s stature, they could hope to have their line accepted.
Therefore, it is not at all unlikely that the Chinese attack on India had little to do with issues
between India and China, but was a reaction to a feeling of isolation, abandonment and frustration.
By attacking India, they may have wanted to topple Nehru or at least push India into the Western
camp so that the USSR could have no illusions about Indian non-alignment and would have to
rethink its policy of peaceful coexistence, which, the Chinese figured, was leading to their isolation.
They failed on both counts. In fact, V.P. Dutt testifies that Deng Xiaoping said later to an Indian
delegation of which he was a member that it was Khrushchev who was responsible for the
1962 war.
Thus, the causes of the 1962 attack were related more to China’s own compulsions, that to anything
that Nehru or India did or could have done. Not being able to get the recognition of the US, a UN
seat, leadership of Afro-Asia, Soviet support on the nuclear issue or the border dispute with India,
a leftward turn took place in Chinese politics. By humiliating India, it wanted to show that India’s
policy of peace and non-alignment was not feasible. Nor was the Soviet policy of peaceful
coexistence. India would leave the policy of non-alignment under pressure and other countries of

196 LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY