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Unit 6: Thomas Hobbes
6.4 Human Nature Notes
Hobbes, like Machiavelli, was concerned with the secular origins of human conduct, for he did not
theorize about proper behaviour from an understanding of the Idea of Good, or from a revelation
of divine commands. Contrary to Aristotle and the medieval thinkers, who saw human nature as
innately social, Hobbes viewed human beings as isolated, egoistic, self-interested, and seeking
society as a means to their ends.
Individuals were creatures of desire, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Pleasures were good
and pain bad, which was why men sought to pursue and maximize their pleasures and avoid
pain. The pleasure-pain theory was developed in a coherent and systematic theory of human
behaviour and motivation by the Utilitarians, especially Bentham in the eighteenth century. In
addition to being creatures of pleasure and pain, Hobbes saw individuals constantly in motion to
satisfy their desires. Continual success in the attainment and fulfilment of their desires was called
felicity, a condition of movement and not rest. Appetites were insatiable, for the satisfaction of
some gave rise to others. Satisfaction therefore was a temporary feeling, for individuals were
aware of the recurrence of desires. Not only did individuals ensure the means for present
satisfaction, but they also provided for future ones.
Hobbes asserted that every human action, feeling and thought was ultimately physically determined,
yet he allowed ample scope for voluntary, self-designed and administrated changes in human
conditions. Though the human being was dependent on his life, on the motion of his body, he was
able, to some extent, to control these motions and make his life. This he did by “natural” means, i.e.
by relying partly on natural passions and partly on reason. It was reason, according to Hobbes, that
distinguished humans from animals. He drew a distinction between “prudence”, which was the
accumulation of experience, and “reason” seen essentially in mathematical terms.
“When a man Reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from Addition
of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from substraction of one summe from another”.
Reason therefore enabled the individual to understand the impressions that sense organs picked
up from the external world, and also indicated an awareness of one’s natural passions. Hobbes
also introduced, interestingly, the need for an “arbitrator” or “judge” who resolved rational
disagreements, since no one individual’s reason was necessarily “right”, so parties to a dispute
needed an arbitrator “to whose sentence they will both stand”. This remained a major theme in the
entire theoretical construct of Hobbes, that order was absolutely necessary and an indispensable
precondition for getting anywhere with human reason, of being able to build any sort of culture.
Hobbes did not exclude the possibility of altruism, listing benevolence, goodwill and charity
among passions. Good and evil were names that signified an individual’s appetite and aversions.
The objects of an individual’s desires varied in accordance with his personal characteristics, but
all—at least ordinarily—desired self-preservation. Peace enhanced the possibilities of preserving
ourselves, so it was good.
It was important to note that the need for an arbitrator was not due to lack of sufficient reason. The
more compelling factor was the barriers erected between human beings as a result of their natural
passions. These passions were directly related to individuals valuing their life above everything
else, and sticking to it at all costs. The “appetites” and “aversions” were basically passions. The
feeling towards things depended on how conducive they were in ensuring and maintaining life,
and was accordingly described as “good” and “bad”. The aim of the individual dictated by passion
was to obtain desired results.
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