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Unit 20: David Hume-Of Essay Writing ...


          its purpose, the consumption of the coffee. The agreeable sentiment is a response to this complex  Notes
          association of impressions and ideas, not to the smell alone. Critical evaluation is therefore highly
          contextual: “The passion, in pronouncing its verdict, considers not the object simply, as it is in
          itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances, which attend it” (S, 224).
          But Hume does not regard imagination as a free and unrestrained activity. Human thought is
          constrained by a relatively small set of permanent principles of imaginative association (T, 10, 225;
          EHU, 24). Although poets may “profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy” (T,
          225), their poetry has little chance of pleasing others if their “fancy” or imagination employs
          irregular associations. The universal principles of imaginative association allow artists to predict
          how their representational and narrative designs will move audiences.
          Hume recognizes a very small class of cases for which imagination association is not needed to
          recognize beauty. In these cases, initial impressions of the mere “form” of a material object generate
          approbation (T, 364). Such cases are more typical of natural beauty than art (EPM, 173). So
          imagination is not always necessary for discovering beauty. Pleasing form is sometimes sufficient.
          However, “’tis seldom we rest there” (T, 363).
          So Hume does not advocate a simple causal relationship between form and sentiment. In most cases,
          our beliefs about the object alter our sentiments. Forms are generally most pleasing when “the order
          and construction of parts” (T, 299) suggests a corresponding utility for humans or expresses agreeable
          emotions. These suggestions need not be accurate in order to trigger approbation and disapprobation.
          A particular object might appear balanced, graceful, and beautiful despite our knowledge of its
          limited utility (T, 584). Objects may displease taste despite their genuine utility.
          A house may displease me by being ill-contrived for the convenience of the owner; and yet I may
          refuse to give a shilling towards the rebuilding of it. Sentiments must touch the heart, to make
          them controul our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them
          influence our taste. When a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and
          disagreeable; though we be fully assured of the solidity of the workmanship. ‘Tis a kind of fear,
          which causes this sentiment of disapprobation; but the passion is not the same with that which we
          feel, when obliged to stand under a wall, that we really think tottering and insecure. The seeming
          tendencies of objects affect the mind: And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those,
          which proceed from the real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these
          emotions are so different in their feeling, that they may often be contrary, without destroying each
          other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy are esteemed beautiful upon
          account of their strength, though we could wish that they were entirely destroyed. The imagination
          adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, from those
          which arise from our particular and momentary situation (T, 586–87).
           It is tempting to read such passages as foreshadowing the subsequent theory of aesthetic response
          as “disinterested” pleasure. Hume uses the term “disinterest” as the contrary of “self-love” (EPM,
          296), but he does not use the term in relation to aesthetic sentiment. Hume’s “common,” “universal,”
          or “general view of things” is a simpler proposal. He wants to remind us that we cannot expect the
          agreement of others if we judge things from a limited and prejudiced perspective (EPM, 272).
          Relations of form and function can operate at an extremely abstract level: “A building, whose
          doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion: as ill adapted
          to the figure of a human creature, for whose service the fabric was intended” (EPM, 212–13). Those
          who respond with sentiment are moved by “imaginary” and general consequences, not simply
          utility for the person passing judgment (EPM, 217–18). Furthermore, formal design itself can
          convey emotions which influence aesthetic response: “There is no rule in painting or statuary
          more indispensable than that of balancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness
          on their proper centre of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced, is ugly; because it conveys
          the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain” (EPM, 245).


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