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Unit 20: David Hume-Of Essay Writing ...

281). Despite myriad differences, there are two basic types of taste: vulgar taste and refined taste. Notes
Given his thorough anti-realism about values, Hume cannot dismiss vulgar taste as subjective and
mistaken. Hume has a different strategy for recommending refined taste as the more objective of
the pair. Vulgar taste is more idiosyncratic and capricious. Refined taste is more properly rule-
governed and stable. The two are equally subject to “rules,” but the person of refined taste is better
informed about the material.
Hume’s contrast of vulgar and refined taste parallels his general treatment of the doxastic positions
of the vulgar and the wise (T, 150; EHU, 110). Vulgar thinking is dominated by “the first influence
of general rules” upon the mind. Such rules are instinctively but “rashly formed” to regulate the
imagination. If these rules are allowed to govern thought in the absence of further reflection and
refinement, the result is prejudice instead of wisdom. (T, 146,150) The wise, in contrast, take care
to survey the broadest possible range of experience, allowing a “second influence of general rules”
to supplant the first. In this manner, the “capricious and uncertain” ideas of the vulgar give way
to “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding” and the superior judgments
of the wise (T, 150). As for the normative question of why the refined judgments of the wise are
preferable to the rash prejudices of the vulgar, Hume is content that moral sense assigns approbation
to the “original instincts” underlying moral and aesthetic taste (T, 619).
Having argued that we can overcome prejudice and make superior assessments of ordinary matters
of fact, Hume imports his contrast of vulgarity and wisdom into his aesthetic theory. Sound
understanding makes inferences and arrives at a belief. Beliefs influence taste. Although a judgment
of taste terminates in a reflective passion, rather than in a belief with a truth-value, taste employs
operations of the imagination subject to rules internalized by the judging subject. Consequently,
the contrast between first and second influences of general rules applies as much to taste as to
“wisdom.” Vulgar taste should betray the same degree of capriciousness and prejudice as vulgar
reasoning. Good taste, in contrast, should be more stable, for it will display “a certain point of
view” appropriate to its object (SOT, 276). Refined taste reflects what Hume elsewhere calls the
“more general” view. As with moral response, good taste meets with approbation while a prejudiced
taste “loses all credit and authority” (SOT, 277). However, as a matter of interpretation, Hume’s
references to a requisite “delicacy of imagination” (SOT, 272) complicate and obscure the account,
for it is not clear what this delicacy is, nor how it contributes to a more settled, general view.
So what are the rules of taste, over and above any rules or principles involved in sound judgment
about the object of taste? Surprisingly, Hume never offers a clear case of one. At least two proposals
about such rules can be extracted from Hume’s example of Sancho’s kin and the hogshead of wine,
Hume’s “evidence” that there are general rules of taste (SOT, 272–73). On the one hand, it is
tempting to read the rules as strictly parallel with the empirical laws discussed in the Treatise and
first Enquiry. If so, they are causal laws specifying which properties and combinations of properties
cause what kind and degree of pleasure. An example might be, “An aftertaste of iron or leather
reduces the pleasure taken in an otherwise good wine.” Unfortunately, such rules seem suitable
only for arriving at some probability about the likely effect of drinking such wine. Applying such
a rule may result in a belief about the wine, but knowing the rule would not encourage the
requisite sentiment. Where we can find them, rules of this sort are useful for separating true from
pretend critics, if only in allowing us to point out inconsistencies in critical response (SOT 273–74).
But general rules of taste have a second function. Even if rules “had never been methodized”
(SOT, 273), their existence supports the view that practice and comparison improves taste (SOT,
275). Those with adequate experience of a particular art form will perceive cases with greater
accuracy. The existence of rules gives reason to agree that practice heightens the subject’s awareness
of disruptive impressions (the taste of iron) and missing impressions (no fruity bouquet), resulting
in a more reflective adjudication of the whole experience. They will also direct the imagination to
expect various combinations of properties in light of one’s recognition that it is a thing of a specific

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