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Unit 20: David Hume-Of Essay Writing ...

emotion, the “movement” of which “fortifies” the predominant passion. Unless the negative emotion Notes
becomes predominant, the overall effect of a well-written tragedy will be an audience “pleased in
proportion as they are afflicted” (OT 258).
Although Hume illustrates his general principle with numerous examples, few readers claim to
understand or accept his theory. Hume thinks it is obvious that Rowe’s play fails due to its gory
and shocking spectacle, which tips the balance in the wrong direction. But the obvious reply is
that many viewers enjoy the spectacle of violence. Hume basically says so: “The English theatre
abounds too much with such shocking images” (OT, 265). How can Hume contend that the play
is ruined when so many viewers enjoy it? For there is no appeal except to sentiment.
Hume must think that shocking spectacle satisfies vulgar taste but not refined taste. “Of the
Standard of Taste” posits differences in audience members to account for different responses.
Hume’s sketchy theory in “Of Tragedy” is compatible with most people enjoying aesthetically
uninteresting works, for routine design readily delights most people (SOT, 276). But a refined
taste is equally sensitive to all facets of the work, including formal design. Just as the wine tasted
funny to Sancho’s kinsmen (SOT, 272–73), a run-of-the-mill work “gives pain” to true critics (SOT,
276). Only the best critics worry about the absence of genius.
The rules of taste endorsed in “Of the Standard of Taste” facilitate habituated expectations based
on previous experiences with similar art. Aesthetic pleasure frequently depends on “custom” (T,
299) and on associations and expectations developed by the life experiences of the intended
audience. If audience expectations are violated by excessive violence, and if there is no compensating
reward for its inclusion, then the work has been improperly staged for its intended audience. But
works that merely satisfy expectations will please the less discerning critics. Hence “shocking
images” that are routine in English theater will please the audience. The same gory spectacle and
“dismal” stories, insufficiently “softened” by genius and eloquence, will displease a refined taste
(OT 265).
Unfortunately, this interpretation merely heightens the problem. What is it that rewards vulgar
taste? Why does violent spectacle attract anyone to routine, predictable potboilers? Natural
sympathy should arouse uneasiness at the gory spectacle, yet the vulgar have no compensating
reward. Brilliant language is surely an attraction of Shakespeare’s Othello, but no such achievement
is to be found in most of the popular fiction that reliably delights its audience. Hume even implies
that the vulgar do not attend to “eloquence” and similar formal achievement. However, the mere
fact of “imitation” seems insufficient to explain the predominant pleasure in the face of this
material. Is it the spectacle’s “exactness of imitation” (SOT, 276)? But that would seem to be a
compensating pleasure in all but the most inept production, and would lead us to expect that
vulgar audiences would respond with equal pleasure to almost any inferior work that meets their
expectations. But this is simply not the case. “Of Tragedy” does not meet the standards of argument
and insight set by Hume’s other contributions to aesthetics.

20.6 David Hume—A Critical Analysis
David Hume (1711-76) is one of the greatest philosophers of the Enlightenment. Writing as an
independent intellectual he made significant contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind,
philosophy of religion and ethics. He is widely reputed as a brilliant although skeptical critic of
every kind of dogmatism and of any pretension to establish objectively valid foundations of
human knowledge. Except for the abstract ideas of mathematics and immediate experiential
impressions he did not believe that there is anything in our mind that deserved full trust and the
honorific title of truth. Consequently, metaphysics and philosophy were, for him, at best a good
pastime (see his A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739, and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
1748). In view of these assertions it is surprising to find out that Hume, on the other hand, had not
dismissed judging of artworks as just a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. Despite his low opinion
of metaphysical pursuits he had a very strong appreciation for the arts and possessed himself a

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