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Prose
Notes The content of Homeric virtues separates his heroes from Odysseus’ son Telemachus as portrayed
by Fenelon. While his father is rather mendacious for modern standards he is truthful to the bone
and never departs from his noble values.
Fenelon (1651-1715) was a bishop and poet (he composed the poem Telemaque in French).
Example 2: Hume’s second example introduces a comparison between two moralities: Islamic
and English. The Quran (Alcoran) praises equity, justice, temperance, meekness, charity, as our
Western culture does, but from the point of view of English morality the content of Mohammedan
virtues equals treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry.
This remark does not sound very politically correct (especially in conjunction with the contention
that the Koran presents a “wild and absurd performance”) but Hume’s intention is rather to show
(partly in a biased Eurocentric way) the discrepancy between the universality of the accepted
precepts and the real sentiments on both sides rather than to assert the superiority of English
morality over Arabic mores. At the end of the essay he finds that many events in the Bible present
a similar picture of cruelty and inhumanity which he repudiates equally because the most sacred
text of the Judeo-Christian tradition not only does not condemn the vicious manners of some
biblical heroes but even condones them (cf. God commands the destruction of Jericho and Ai).
Conclusion: There is no standard of morality that universally distinguishes right and wrong.
There are no eternal moral norms, only historically and culturally conditioned habits disguised
into seeming general precepts. But this generality is more linguistic than real.
Merit: The value of general precepts, commandments and duties is very spurious. The effectiveness
of such precepts is questionable. Formulating universal ethical principles is a big stretch. Their
strength does not surpass the meaning of the words used. Their import is purely verbal - at best
they explicate the implicit positive connotation of certain expressions. For instance by commending
charity, virtue, etc., we say that that these notions ar conceived as commendable. It is safer to
follow the ‘inculcated’ (intended) meaning of these words than to derive universal maxims of
conduct based on some supposed objective obligations. The writers, preachers and legislators who
go for the latter are doomed to be less convincing than what the sheer word semantics suggest.
Only what is already contained in the connotation resonates - everything else is a chimera.
Hume’s reasoning could be summarized in the following way: Moral precepts either state what is
already meant by language or they go beyond it. If the former they are redundant, if the latter they
overreach their boundaries.
Application: The same reasoning should apply to aesthetic terms. They, being just condensed
expressions of sentiments (of pleasure or displeasure), include some approbation or disapprobation
- but they do not warrant any universal and objective rules about objects.
In Search of a Standard
Claims: One would expect, based on Hume’s general stance and the above observations, that he
is going to assert the inescapability of utter subjectivism and relativism in matters of taste.
Surprisingly, however, he makes a series of non-skeptical and non-relativist claims:
1. It is natural to seek a standard of taste.
2. Such a standard of taste exists.
3. The standard of taste can reconcile different sentiments.
4. The standard of taste allows to evaluate different tastes as to their quality and thus decides
which one is to be preferred.
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