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Notes distinct from the sentiment of approbation. The sentiment is incorporated into the analysis, but the
sentiment is not itself a dispositional property.
Suppose that Hume regards beauty as a dispositional property. Like the dispositional terms
“buoyant” and “brittle,” “beauty” could be predicated of objects, generating judgments that are
true or false for different objects. Statements attributing dispositional properties to objects are true
even if the appropriate conditions are never satisfied (e.g., “This vase is brittle” can be true despite
the fact that the vase never gets broken). Yet Hume clearly denies that judgments of taste are truth-
valued, and he denies that it makes sense to make inferences about an object’s beauty in advance
of the requisite sentiment (S, 219).
Hume famously argues that, in order to clarify any idea, “we need but enquire, from what
impression is that supposed idea derived” (EHU, 22). If beauty is a dispositional property, then
one arrives at the idea of beauty by associating particular causes with particular effects under
specific conditions. In Hume’s terminology, a dispositional idea of beauty would be the idea of a
complex relation of cause and effect. It would be a causal principle, and we could not employ the
idea prior to formulating such a principle. Yet, once again, Hume denies an implication of the
dispositional analysis. The sentiment of approbation is our only source for our idea of beauty, and
there are cases where we recognize beauty in advance of any reasoning about the beautiful object
(EPM, 173).
Furthermore, if Hume regards beauty as a dispositional property, he has a model close at hand in
Hutcheson’s analysis. But Hume avoids offering any such account. Aside from a willingness to
identify several ways that works of art must fail to please refined taste, Hume ignores the traditional
and familiar project of criticism, the stipulation of rules for successful art. He does not try to
identify the properties of objects that regularly cause the sentiment of approbation. Instead, he
recognizes that any established correlation between sentiment and objective properties might be
defeated by the next example that we encounter (SOT, 270). Despite the existence of “general
principles of approbation or blame,” taste depends on too many variables (“incidents and
situations”) to offer a detailed dispositional analysis (SOT, 271).
Passages endorsing a dispositional account might be slips of the pen. Or, more likely, Hume does
not believe that it is possible to define evaluative terms. They are indefinable, primitive terms.
Hume emphasizes that “certain qualities in objects” are the occasions for our sentiments of
approbation and disapprobation (SOT, 273). Formal design is one such quality (SOT 271; T, 299,
364). The existence of occasioning qualities provides theoretical support for the possibility of a
convergence of refined taste. So our primitive evaluative terms are not arbitrarily applied.
Nonetheless, it is irresponsible to endorse any particular thing or action in advance of the verdict
of unprejudiced taste.
Imagination and Point of View

Informed understanding makes a vital contribution to most aesthetic and moral judgment (EPM,
173; SOT, 277). For Hume, taste is improved by practice in making “comparisons” among objects
(SOT, 275) and by the employment of “good sense” (SOT, 277).
Hume blurs traditional distinctions between thinking and imagining. Thoughts would not extend
beyond our actual experiences were it not for the imaginative associations established by the force
of repetition or “custom” (T, 170; EHU, 43). Learned associations encourage us to rearrange our
ideas in intelligible patterns, permitting us to create ideas of things never actually experienced
(e.g., fictitious creatures or distant places). Imagination also creates chains of associated ideas,
encouraging thoughts to move rapidly from one idea to another.
Good taste therefore presupposes an active imagination. Suppose one wakes in the morning and
smells the distinctive aroma of coffee, and the experience is pleasurable. This appreciation depends
on a learned, imaginative association: the smell brings to mind its cause, the brewing coffee, and

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